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ARTICLE 
EQUAL ACCESS AND THE RIGHT TO MARRY 
NELSON TEBBE† & DEBORAH A. WIDISS†† 
How should courts think about the right to marry?  This is a question of 
principle, of course, but it has also become a matter of litigation strategy for ad-
vocates challenging different-sex marriage requirements across the country.  We 
argue that the right to marry is best conceptualized as a matter of equal access 
to government support and recognition, and we contend that the doctrinal ve-
hicle that most closely matches the structure of the right can be found in the 
fundamental interest branch of equal protection law.  Two other arguments 
have dominated litigation and adjudication so far, but both of them suffer from 
weaknesses.  First, a liberty theory grounded in due process argues that everyone 
has a fundamental right to civil marriage.  But civil marriage is a government 
program that states likely could abolish without constitutional difficulty. In 
that way, it differs from other family-related liberties such as the ability to pro-
create or engage in sexual intimacy.  Second, an equality theory suggests that 
classifications on the basis of sexual orientation are constitutionally suspect.  
But that approach is unlikely to succeed in the Supreme Court or many state 
tribunals.  Equal access, in contrast, requires states to justify laws that selec-
tively interfere with civil marriage, regardless of any independent due process or 
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classification-based equal protection violations.  We show how this approach is 
grounded in precedent regarding intimate relationships, as well as in analog-
ous law concerning voting and court access.  Our proposal offers courts a 
workable way to evaluate the constitutionality of different-sex marriage re-
quirements and a more satisfying conceptual basis for the right to marry gener-
ally.  It also suggests a useful framework for thinking about recognition of other 
nontraditional family structures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How should courts think about the right to marry?  This is a ques-
tion of principle, of course, but it is also a matter of litigation strategy 
for advocates challenging different-sex marriage laws across the coun-
try.  Now that David Boies and Theodore Olson have filed a promi-
nent federal lawsuit, the question has taken on even greater urgency.1  
1 Complaint, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-2292 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2009). 
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In this Article, we argue that the interest at stake is best described as a 
right that we call equal access :  once a state decides to recognize and 
support marriage, it presumptively must make that status available 
evenhandedly.  Our concept of equal access is grounded doctrinally in 
the fundamental interest branch of equal protection law; it is distinct 
from the substantive due process claims and classification-based equal 
protection claims that have dominated recent efforts to enforce mar-
riage rights.  We show that in earlier cases concerning civil marriage, 
as well as in analogous cases concerning voting and court access, the 
Supreme Court has invalidated selective denials of access to funda-
mentally important government institutions even if the interests at 
stake were not separately protected by the Due Process Clause and 
even if a particular classification was not recognized as inherently sus-
pect.2  Yet in the same-sex marriage context, courts and commentators 
have failed to appreciate the extent to which fundamental interest 
claims under the Equal Protection Clause require separate analysis.  
This is a significant oversight that forfeits the unrealized potential—
both strategic and conceptual—of the equal access approach. 
Our proposal is particularly important because both of the prima-
ry alternative arguments supporting marriage rights for same-sex 
couples have weaknesses.  First, a liberty theory grounded in substan-
tive due process argues that everyone has a fundamental right to civil 
marriage.3  This claim has been largely unsuccessful in same-sex mar-
riage litigation.  State courts and lower federal courts have typically 
agreed (often with little analysis) that there is a fundamental right to 
marry for different-sex couples.  However, they have held that there is 
no corresponding right to “same-sex marriage” because that specific 
interest is not deeply rooted in American history and traditions, as 
some due process doctrine seems to require.4  Thus, even in states 
where same-sex couples have won the right to marry, courts have 
rested their holdings on grounds other than a fundamental right to 
marriage protected by federal or state due process provisions.5 
2 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Harper v. Va. Bd. 
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) 
(criminal appeals). 
3 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2006) (noting the plaintiffs’ 
due process argument). 
4 See, e.g., id. at 9 (“The right to marry is unquestionably a fundamental right.  The 
right to marry someone of the same sex, however, is not ‘deeply rooted’; it has not 
even been asserted until relatively recent times.” (citations omitted)). 
5 See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 889-904 (Iowa 2009) (applying heigh-
tened scrutiny to strike down marriage bans on the grounds that sexual orientation is a 
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We disagree with the line these courts draw between “marriage” 
and “same-sex marriage,” but there is a deeper difficulty with this first 
line of argument:  there may be no due process right to civil marriage 
at all, even for different-sex couples.6  First of all, the precedents that 
courts cite when they seek to identify a due process right to marry 
ground that right in the separate liberty interest in procreation.  That 
connection has been undermined by the widespread acceptance—as a 
matter of constitutional doctrine, statutory reform, and societal 
change—of sexual intimacy and childbearing outside marriage.  But 
the more fundamental issue is that civil marriage is a government pro-
gram that provides certain benefits and imposes certain obligations.  In 
this respect, it differs from other family-related liberties, such as rights 
that protect decisions regarding child rearing, procreation, contracep-
tion use, or termination of a pregnancy.  All of those rights exist inde-
pendent of government involvement, and all of them enjoy protection 
against state interference under substantive due process doctrine.  Civil 
marriage is also different from private or religious marriage, which like-
wise may well be protected by a basic liberty right.7 
To see this, consider that states could almost certainly get out of 
the marriage business altogether, leaving marriage to religious groups 
or other private institutions.  They could choose to offer civil unions 
or domestic partnerships, under which both same-sex and different-
sex couples would enjoy all the material benefits that formerly flowed 
only from marriage.  Or they could choose to make other family rela-
suspect class); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) 
(same).  The one exception is California, which suggested that same-sex couples have a 
right to marry—or, at least, to have their relationships formally recognized by the 
state—based in part on the state’s due process clause, although the court relied more 
heavily on a separate constitutional provision addressing privacy interests.  In re Mar-
riage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 419-20 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, 
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009). 
6 See Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27, 40-43 
(1996) (concluding that a state could abolish civil marriage without violating due process); 
Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2083 (2005) (same).  
7 In our terminology, “civil marriage” refers to marriages that are recognized by 
the government.  In most states, to enter a civil marriage, a couple must apply for a 
state marriage license, generally by completing a form that demonstrates that they 
meet the marriage requirements as defined under state law, and they must solemnize 
their marriage in a civil proceeding or religious ceremony after which the (religious or 
secular) officiant files the marriage license with the state.  “Civil union” or “domestic 
partnership” describes a separate status, also created by the government (sometimes 
available to both different- and same-sex couples and sometimes available only to same-
sex couples), that provides some or all of the benefits and obligations of civil marriage 
without using the term “marriage.”   
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tionships the primary bases for government benefits or recognition, 
such as relationships between parents and children.8  While these op-
tions are probably not politically viable today, they likely do not violate 
any federal constitutional rights.  Yet abolishing civil marriage would 
impose the greatest possible burden on the freedom to participate in 
state-sponsored marriage.  That result seems incompatible with a pure 
liberty approach that grounds the right to civil marriage in due process. 
The second argument dominating litigation today is that different-
sex marriage requirements discriminate on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion in violation of the Equal Protection Clause or parallel state provi-
sions.9  Generally, the success of this claim has turned on whether 
courts have been willing to hold that classifications on the basis of 
sexual orientation require heightened scrutiny.  Plaintiffs have won 
the right to marry, or at least the right to a legal status equivalent to 
marriage, in states that have determined that sexual orientation classi-
fications are presumptively suspect.10  But state courts in New York, 
Washington, Maryland, Indiana, and Arizona have all held that classi-
fications on the basis of sexual orientation do not pose special con-
cerns.11  Lower federal courts have also rejected the contention that 
such distinctions should be recognized as inherently suspect.12  There 
is a widespread sense that the Supreme Court is unlikely to announce a 
new constitutional presumption against all classifications based on sex-
ual orientation.  Partly, this may be because the Court seems to be mov-
ing away from the traditional tiers-of-scrutiny framework altogether.13  
And where ordinary review has been applied, most courts have upheld 
8 See generally, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE 
SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) (advocating that 
states allocate benefits on the basis of parent-child and other caretaker-dependent re-
lationships rather than marital-nuclear-family relationships); NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND 
(STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:  VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008) (ar-
guing that the state should not privilege marriage above other diverse family forms). 
9 Advocates and commentators have also argued that different-sex marriage re-
quirements constitute sex discrimination because they limit marriage based on the sex 
of each member of the couple, but courts have typically rejected this argument.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 159-161. 
10 See, e.g., Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 482; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 906-07. 
11 Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2003); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Conaway v. Deane, 
932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. 
King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006). 
12 See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307-08 (M.D. Fla. 2005). 
13 See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 518-24 
(2004) (describing how tiered review seems to be breaking down and advocating a 
move to a single, uniform test). 
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marriage bans,14 although Massachusetts found that different-sex mar-
riage requirements failed to satisfy even rationality review.15  Overall, the 
classification-based equal protection argument against same-sex mar-
riage exclusions faces real challenges, particularly in federal court. 
We argue that the right of equal access to civil marriage is best 
thought of neither solely as a matter of due process, nor only as a 
question of classification-based equal protection.  Instead, our equal 
access approach holds that, once conferred, the right to marry in a le-
gally recognized ceremony is fundamental:  if a government decides 
to recognize and support civil marriage, it cannot exclude same-sex 
couples without providing an adequate justification.  A presumption 
of unconstitutionality is appropriate here because of the particular 
harm that may arise when the material and expressive benefits of a 
fundamentally important government institution are extended une-
qually.  That harm may exist even if the interest at stake is not a fun-
damental liberty protected by the Due Process Clause and even if a 
particular classification has not been recognized as inherently suspect.  
Independent analysis is required to determine whether a different-sex 
marriage requirement can stand under our equal access proposal.  
Pointing this out to courts is effective strategy for litigants.  As impor-
tant, equal access opens up a more satisfying way of conceptualizing 
the right to civil marriage. 
We show that the right to marry is similar in structure to other 
guarantees, particularly the right to vote and the right of access to cer-
tain court procedures.  There is no fundamental right to participate in 
federal presidential elections or state elections under the Federal Due 
Process Clause, according to conventional thinking.16  However, once 
a state chooses to hold elections, barring a subset of citizens from the 
polls can raise an equal protection problem because of the fundamen-
tal importance of the franchise.17  Likewise, there is no due process 
14 See cases cited supra note 11. 
15 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003). 
16 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973) 
(noting that “the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right”); Pope v. 
Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904) (“The privilege to vote in any State is not given by 
the Federal Constitution, or by any of its amendments.”); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 
U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (noting that the state legislature has plenary power to choose electors 
for the electoral college and that it may decide to choose electors itself rather than 
hold a direct election); Cain, supra note 6, at 35-36 (“If a state were to abolish in total 
the right of its citizens to vote in state elections, no explicit provision of the United States 
Constitution would be violated.”); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2096 (“As the Constitution is 
now understood, states are not required to provide elections for state offices.”).   
17 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).  
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right to appeal a criminal conviction.  But if a state offers criminal ap-
peals, it must take steps to ensure that poor people are not excluded.18  
Unequal access to certain civil legal proceedings concerning the fami-
ly, such as divorce or termination of parental rights, may also be un-
constitutional.19  Neither due process nor equal protection wholly ex-
plains the results in these cases—instead, the overlapping interests at 
stake deserve special consideration.20  We contend that something sim-
ilar is true of civil marriage:  because of its fundamental importance, 
selective exclusion from legal wedlock should be presumptively un-
constitutional. 
A few scholars have supported variants of our argument, although 
their proposals have differed from equal access in important respects.  
Most helpfully, Cass Sunstein has argued for a fundamental interest 
theory of the right to marry, supported in part by an analogy to voting 
rights.21  However, he ultimately asks courts to enforce a conception of 
the right to marry that falls short of our concept of equal access.  
Sunstein concludes that although bans on same-sex marriage raise 
“serious” constitutional concerns, courts should refrain from striking 
them down, largely for prudential reasons.22  By contrast, we urge 
courts presented with such claims to enforce the Constitution’s guar-
antees, and we think that doing so on equal access grounds would be 
compatible with practical and institutional considerations.23 
18 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (“[T]here can be no equal 
justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys ‘depends on the amount of money he 
has.’” (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956))). 
19 See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding that a state could not dismiss a 
mother’s appeal from a termination of parental rights solely because she could not af-
ford record-preparation fees); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding 
that a state could not deny access to divorce proceedings solely because of inability to 
pay court fees and costs). 
20 See, e.g., M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120 (observing that “the Court’s decisions concern-
ing access to judicial process . . . reflect both equal protection and due process con-
cerns” and that a “precise rationale has not been composed because cases of this order 
cannot be resolved according to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis” (internal quota-
tion marks and citations omitted)).  
21 Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2083-85.  Patricia Cain likewise argues that the right to 
marry is properly grounded in the fundamental interest branch of equal protection 
law, draws analogies to voting, and concludes, as we do, that the state could constitu-
tionally abolish marriage.  See generally Cain, supra note 6.  However, she also focuses on 
state rationales for civil marriage, and she ultimately argues that state recognition of 
nonmarriage equivalents would be sufficient.  Id. pt. V.  In contrast, we argue that 
equal access to the expressive benefits of civil marriage is critical. 
22 See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2114.  
23 Additionally, Sunstein’s article was written before almost all of the recent same-
sex marriage cases were decided, and he only explores the implications of his ap-
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We develop and defend our argument in three parts.  Part I de-
scribes difficulties with the due process argument for a fundamental 
right to civil marriage for same-sex couples and—more surprisingly—
even for different-sex couples.  It shows how that argument has played 
out in federal and state litigation and points out its flaws.  Part II ar-
gues that the classification-based equal protection argument is unlike-
ly to succeed in federal court or many state courts.  Part III argues for 
our equal access proposal, demonstrating how it would work doctri-
nally and why it is preferable to the dominant alternatives, both con-
ceptually and strategically.  In conclusion, we suggest that equal access 
also offers a promising framework for rethinking the constitutional 
status of other nontraditional family arrangements. 
Our proposal offers the best of both worlds.  On the one hand, it 
reaffirms the fundamental importance of marriage and emphasizes 
that everyone presumptively has a right to marry once a state decides to 
offer civil marriages.  This right of evenhanded access is not limited to 
a particular group.  On the other hand, the equality component of 
our theory provides a better vehicle for consideration of the expres-
sive elements of marriage and the dignitary harms that flow from the 
creation of “separate but equal” solutions such as extending equiva-
lent material benefits to gay and lesbian couples under the rubric of 
civil unions.  Moreover, equal access is both backward looking and 
forward looking.  Unlike due process, which generally looks to tradi-
tion, equal protection is designed to remedy governmental depriva-
tion of rights, including longstanding ones.24  Finally, equal access 
stands a better chance of success in litigation than the alternatives.  
Courts will rightly perceive it to be less radical because it does not ask 
them to announce a new suspect class, nor does it require them to 
declare a freestanding fundamental right to marry applicable to same-
proach for that issue in a limited way.  By contrast, we carefully analyze and critique 
how courts have understood these claims in the context of same-sex marriage, and our 
proposal responds to limitations of the two principal arguments advanced up until 
now.  We have also found helpful Pamela Karlan’s discussions of the “stereoscopic” 
overlap of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.  Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Pro-
tection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473 
(2002) [hereinafter Karlan, Stereoscopic]; Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword:  Loving Lawrence, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1448 (2004) [hereinafter Karlan, Foreword].  However, her fo-
cus is not on marriage rights. 
24 In Harper, a case located in the fundamental interest wing of equal protection 
law, the Court noted that “[i]n determining what lines are unconstitutionally discrimi-
natory, we have never been confined to historic notions of equality” and it emphasized 
that “[n]otions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause do change.”  Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). 
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sex couples.  Instead, our proposal offers a sensible, moderate judicial 
response to the controversy around same-sex marriage. 
I.  DUE PROCESS 
In the past decade, same-sex couples seeking the right to marry 
have brought numerous challenges to different-sex marriage re-
quirements.  They have relied on two principal arguments:  (1) differ-
ent-sex marriage requirements violate the Due Process Clause or state 
analogues, and (2) those requirements classify on the basis of sexual 
orientation in violation of federal or state equal protection guaran-
tees.  Although advocates have had some notable successes, principally 
with the second argument, many courts have rejected both approach-
es.  This Part identifies significant weaknesses in the due process strat-
egy, while the next Part discusses limitations of the standard equal 
protection theory. 
Section I.A briefly reviews the current state of litigation challeng-
ing different-sex marriage requirements.  Section I.B argues that Su-
preme Court precedent establishing a “right to marry” is muddled, 
chiefly because the Court has blended equal protection and due 
process rationales.  Section I.C shows that recent decisions have de-
nied due process claims on the ground that tradition does not recog-
nize a right to marriage for same-sex couples and it explains why we do 
not find that argument persuasive.  Section I.D then concludes that 
the due process argument—as applied to both same-sex and different-
sex couples—suffers from two more serious weaknesses:  its doctrinal 
underpinnings have been undermined and it mischaracterizes the 
structure of the right to civil marriage when it focuses solely on liberty. 
A.  A Brief Summary of Litigation 
Civil marriage in this country has primarily been a matter of state 
law.  Until recently, it has been limited to the union of one man and 
one woman, either implicitly or explicitly.  In the 1970s, same-sex 
couples brought a handful of cases challenging different-sex marriage 
requirements, but all of these early claims were unsuccessful.25 
25 See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).  The 
same-sex couple seeking marriage rights in Baker v. Nelson appealed the case to the Su-
preme Court of the United States, which dismissed the appeal “for want of substantial 
federal question.”  409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972).  Although a summary dismissal is techni-
cally a dismissal on the merits, the Supreme Court has made clear that such a dismissal 
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In the 1990s, same-sex couples won preliminary victories in Hawaii 
and Alaska using state constitutional law.26  Although each state re-
sponded by amending its constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage 
specifically,27 the decisions sparked a nationwide debate that continues 
to this day.  Numerous states passed legislation or constitutional 
amendments explicitly limiting marriage to different-sex couples.28  
Congress also enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which 
specifies that the federal benefits of marriage will only be available to 
different-sex couples and that states will not be required, under the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause, to recognize same-sex marriages from 
other states.29  Courts in Arizona,30 California,31 Indiana,32 Maryland,33 
does not “have the same precedential value . . . as does an opinion of th[e] Court after 
briefing and oral argument on the merits.”  Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tri-
bes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 477 n.20 (1979).  The Court has there-
fore suggested that although generally “inferior federal courts had best adhere to the 
view that if the Court has branded a question as unsubstantial, it remains so,” this may 
not be the case “when doctrinal developments indicate otherwise.”  Hicks v. Miranda, 
422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted).  As discussed in detail in 
the text, both equal protection and due process doctrines, as related to the question of 
same-sex marriage, have evolved considerably since 1972, when Baker was dismissed.  Ac-
cordingly, we agree with courts that have held that the dismissal in Baker does not bar 
lower federal courts from substantively considering the federal constitutional claims that 
case raised.  See, e.g., In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 135-38 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).  How-
ever, we recognize that other federal courts have held that Baker is binding precedent.  
See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1304-05 (M.D. Fla. 2005).  In any case, Baker 
is not a binding determination on state constitutional claims, including claims brought 
under state analogues of federal constitutional provisions.  See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 
855 N.E.2d 1, 17 n.4 (N.Y. 2006) (deeming Baker instructive on the scope of the federal 
Due Process Clause as interpreted in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), but noting that 
the New York Due Process Clause may be interpreted “more expansively”).  And of 
course, the U.S. Supreme Court may choose to consider any federal constitutional claims 
on the merits and overrule whatever precedential significance Baker holds.   
26 See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska 
Super. Ct. 1998) (holding that state different-sex-marriage requirements triggered strict 
scrutiny because they interfered with the right to privacy, classified on the basis of sex, 
and placed limitations on the exercise of a fundamental right); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 
44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that state different-sex-marriage requirements employed sex-
based classifications subject to strict scrutiny under the state’s equal protection clause). 
27 See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
28 See Human Rights Campaign, Marriage and Relationship Recognition, 
http://www.hrc.org/issues/marriage/marriage_laws.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2010) 
(cataloguing state provisions). 
29 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
30 Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2003). 
31 Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).  The California decision upholds a 
constitutional amendment limiting marriage to different-sex couples but relies heavily 
on the fact that California permits same-sex couples to form domestic partnerships 
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New York,34 Oregon,35 Washington,36 and the District of Columbia37 
have held that statutory or constitutional provisions limiting marriage 
to different-sex couples do not violate their respective constitutions.  A 
handful of lower federal courts have likewise held that DOMA and state 
constitutional amendments do not violate the Federal Constitution.38 
At the same time, a growing number of states, as well as the Dis-
trict of Columbia, currently permit same-sex couples to marry or offer 
legal statuses that provide all of the (state-controlled) rights and bene-
fits of marriage.  In 2003, Massachusetts became the first state to per-
mit gay couples to marry, following a ruling by its high court.39  Since 
then, Connecticut40 and Iowa41 have also permitted marriage for same-
sex couples after their high courts overturned exclusions.  Legislatures 
in New Hampshire,42 Vermont,43 and the District of Columbia44 have 
allowed same-sex marriage without being required to do so by judicial 
decisions.  The legislature in Maine tried to do so as well,45 but its law 
was subsequently repealed by voter referendum.46  Likewise, the Cali-
that provide the legal rights and benefits of marriage.  Id. at 74-77.  An earlier Califor-
nia decision had held that a statutory provision that limited marriage to different-sex 
couples violated the state constitution.  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
32 Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
33 Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007). 
34 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).  
35 Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 2005). 
36 Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006). 
37 Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995). 
38 See, e.g., Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (uphold-
ing DOMA); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (same); In re Kandu, 
315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (same); see also Citizens for Equal Protection v. 
Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that a Nebraska constitutional amend-
ment limiting marriage to different-sex couples did not violate the Federal Constitution).  
39 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); see also Opi-
nions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004) (determining that the 
state must offer same-sex couples the right to marry rather than access to a separate 
status such as civil union). 
40 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).  
41 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
42 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (2010). 
43 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2009).  In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court had 
held that the state’s failure to provide the rights and benefits of marriage violated its 
state constitution but that the state could meet its obligation by creating a separate civil 
union status.  Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999). 
44 Council of D.C. B18-0482, Council Period 18 (D.C. 2009). 
45 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §§ 650-A, 650-B, 651 (2009). 
46 See Dep’t of the Sec’y of State, Bureau of Corps., Elections & Comm’ns, 2009 Refe-
rendum Tabulation, http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2009/referendumbycounty. 
html (reporting 52.9% approval of Question 1, a “people’s veto” of the Maine legislation).  
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fornia Supreme Court held that a state statute limiting marriage to 
different-sex couples was unconstitutional47 but its decision was over-
turned by a subsequent referendum, Proposition 8, which amended 
the state constitution to specify that marriage in California was solely 
between a man and a woman.48  Additionally, California, Nevada, New 
Jersey, Oregon, and Washington have created separate legal statuses, 
known as civil unions or domestic partnerships, that are available to 
same-sex couples and that afford all of the state-level benefits and obli-
gations of marriage.49  (Some of these states were responding to direc-
tives from their courts; other legislatures acted on their own initiative.) 
Accordingly, there are two distinct issues currently being litigated.  
One is whether an absolute denial of access to civil marriage or an 
equivalent status is unconstitutional; the second is whether the crea-
tion of a separate status is itself unconstitutional.  Up until now, the 
bulk of litigation has been in state courts under state constitutions.  
Many state constitutions, however, contain protections that parallel 
the Federal Constitution, and consequently most decisions rely heavily 
on federal precedent. 
In May 2009, prominent Supreme Court litigators David Boies and 
Theodore Olsen (adversaries in Bush v. Gore50) filed a federal lawsuit 
challenging California’s constitutional amendment, Proposition 8.51  
Their lawsuit ensures that constitutional issues surrounding the right 
to marry for same-sex couples will now receive a high-profile hearing 
in federal court. 
B.  Confusion over the “Right to Marry” 
From time to time, the Supreme Court has said that there is a 
fundamental right to marry.  However, both the rationale for that 
right and its structure have remained unclear.  Justices have drawn on 
both due process and equal protection rationales, sometimes alternat-
ing between them, sometimes relying on both, and sometimes explicitly 
47 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
48 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
49 See generally Human Rights Campaign, supra note 28.  Additionally, Colorado, 
Hawaii, Maine, and Wisconsin have enacted state laws that provide some, but not all, 
spousal rights to same-sex couples, and New York recognizes same-sex marriages 
formed in other jurisdictions.  Id. 
50 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
51 Complaint, supra note 1. 
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invoking neither.52  The reasons for that confusion are easy to under-
stand, and historically, the failure to differentiate between the two ra-
tionales may have been relatively insignificant.  However, the current 
controversy over marriage rights for same-sex couples highlights the 
confusion and calls for greater clarity. 
Loving v. Virginia was probably the most significant early decision 
concerning the constitutional right to marry.  Because it invalidated a 
selective exclusion from civil marriage, it also provides important sup-
port for our equal access approach.53  In Loving, the Court famously 
struck down Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law, relying primarily on the 
Equal Protection Clause.  It ruled that Virginia had employed invidious 
racial classifications,54 and it rejected the state’s argument that the sta-
tute applied equally to blacks and whites, holding instead that its provi-
sions were “measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”55  That 
equal protection rationale was sufficient to justify the outcome. 
Yet in two paragraphs at the end of its decision, the Court added 
that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the 
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by 
free men,” and it therefore indicated that the Virginia law also vi-
olated the Due Process Clause.56  “Marriage is one of the basic civil 
rights of man,” the Court said, and marriage is “fundamental to our 
very existence and survival.”57  This language could have been  
understood to articulate a liberty theory, under which anti-
miscegenation laws were unconstitutional not (only) because they clas-
sified on the basis of race, but because they interfered with the exercise 
of a fundamental freedom, the right to marry. 
52 See Cain, supra note 6, at 32-33 (“One cannot even tell under current Supreme 
Court jurisprudence whether marriage is a ‘fundamental right’ for purposes of subs-
tantive due process . . . or whether it is only a fundamental right whose allocation must 
adhere to notions of equal protection.”); Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 982-85 (1979) (“[ J]udicial selection of values 
for special protection against the majoritarian process has wavered . . . between a liber-
ty base and an equality base . . . . This doctrinal imprecision has bred unpredictability, 
disrespect, and charges of outcome-orientation.”). 
53 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
54 Id. at 11. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 12. 
57 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Loving is probably best understood as a hybrid case, however.58  
Even in its short discussion of the due process question, the Court in-
terwove considerations of evenhandedness and autonomy: 
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the 
racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly 
subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without 
due process of law.
59
  
That blended language might have raised doubts about whether the 
due process right was doing any independent work in Loving.  Even 
if not, this section added something important to the analysis:  a 
specific concern with the selective denial, on the basis of race, of 
access to the fundamentally important institution of civil marriage.  
In this respect, the Court’s analysis of the due process claim could be 
understood as partially sitting within the developing fundamental in-
terest branch of equal protection law. 
In fact, the Loving Court borrowed the idea that marriage is fun-
damental to human survival from Skinner v. Oklahoma, arguably the 
first decision in that line of equal protection decisions.60  There, in the 
course of ending Oklahoma’s practice of sterilizing certain criminals, 
the Court acknowledged the importance of procreation, calling it 
“one of the basic civil rights of man.”61  It added that “[m]arriage,” 
along with procreation, was “fundamental to the very existence and 
survival of the race.”62  Ultimately, the Court grounded its decision in 
equal protection rather than due process.  That was possible because 
the state only sterilized people who had committed larceny, not those 
who had been convicted of embezzlement—even though the mone-
tary amounts stolen might have been the same, and even though the 
two crimes otherwise carried equivalent punishments.  Larcenists were 
58 See Karlan, Foreword, supra note 23, at 1448 (“Loving was not simply an equal pro-
tection case.  Rather, the case represents a turning point, as the Court moved from the 
completed project of imposing strict scrutiny on racial classifications toward a new 
project of applying strict scrutiny to limitations on fundamental rights. . . . Today, most 
courts and scholars see the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses as discrete bases 
for strict scrutiny.  But in Loving, the two clauses operated in tandem.”). 
59 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; see also Karlan, Foreword, supra note 23, at 1448-49 (“[I]n 
articulating its Due Process Clause-based argument, the Court relied on Skinner v. Ok-
lahoma, an equal protection decision, for the proposition that marriage ‘is one of the ba-
sic civil rights of man.’ . . . This use of equal protection decisions to inform conceptions 
of liberty, and vice versa, was a hallmark of the Warren Court.” (citation omitted)). 
60 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
61 Id. at 541. 
62 Id. 
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not a “protected class” for purposes of equal protection analysis, and 
consequently regulation of larcenists was presumptively allowed.63  But 
because Oklahoma made this sort of distinction with respect to steriliza-
tion, the Court concluded that the state had “made as invidious a dis-
crimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for op-
pressive treatment.”64  Although Skinner did not concern equal access 
to a voluntary government program—in fact, it concerned conduct that 
today would probably merit independent due process protection—it 
nevertheless is critical to our approach because it framed the funda-
mental interest aspect of equal protection doctrine. 
Zablocki v. Redhail came closest to articulating an equal access un-
derstanding of the right to marry.65  There, the Court invalidated a 
state law prohibiting fathers who owed child support from wedding 
without a court order.66  Although the decision was grounded squarely 
in equal protection, it nevertheless referred liberally to the full range 
of precedents articulating a “right to marry,” including those that un-
derstood the right as a matter of liberty protected by due process.67  
Justice Douglas cited Skinner and Loving for the proposition that “deci-
sions of this Court confirm that the right to marry is of fundamental 
importance for all individuals.”68  Heightened scrutiny applied not be-
cause individuals who failed to pay child support (or the poor general-
ly) constituted a protected class but because the regulation at issue 
significantly limited access to civil marriage.69  So Zablocki is a seminal 
case for the equal access approach. 
Finally, in Turner v. Safley, the Court struck down a Missouri prison 
regulation that prohibited inmates from marrying unless they could 
obtain permission of the superintendent, which would be given only 
under “compelling” circumstances.70  Without specifying whether its 
63 “[I]f we had here only a question as to a State’s classification of crimes, such as 
embezzlement or larceny, no substantial federal question would be raised.”  Id. at 540. 
64 Id. at 541. 
65 434 U.S. 374 (1978).  
66 Id. at 390-91. 
67 Id. at 384-85 (citing Loving and Skinner).  Zablocki also relied on Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which had characterized marital privacy as lying within a 
zone of privacy created by several constitutional guarantees, and Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 
U.S. 371 (1971), a due process decision regarding access to divorce proceedings.  Id.   
68 Id. at 384. 
69 See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2088 (“[T]he Court’s ultimate holding [in Zablocki] 
turned on the fundamental rights branch of the equal protection doctrine, not on 
substantive due process.”). 
70 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987).  The State apparently had conceded that the decision to 
marry was a fundamental right for non-inmates. See id. 
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decision was grounded in the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protec-
tion Clause,71 the Court characterized the “right to marry” as “funda-
mental” and held that even in the prison context the state must show 
at least a reasonable relationship between a marriage regulation and 
legitimate penal objectives.72  The Court noted that marriage retained 
considerable significance even for inmates, both because their unions 
would likely be consummated in the future, and because such mar-
riages were “expressions of emotional support and public commit-
ment,” exercises of religious faith, and preconditions for receipt of 
numerous government benefits.73 
Running through this line of cases, then, is a conviction that mar-
riage is fundamentally important, often explicitly because of its con-
nection to procreation and child rearing.  Despite that common 
thread, however, the cases do not share a consistent doctrinal basis.  
Skinner and Zablocki found equal protection violations, Loving articu-
lated two separate rationales but intertwined consideration of equal 
protection and due process, and Turner was unclear about the constitu-
71 Carlos Ball contends that the Supreme Court and the lower courts “all viewed 
the case solely from the perspective of due process and fundamental rights” and argues 
that Turner therefore  
is the case that most clearly supports the proposition that the state has a due 
process obligation to recognize at least some relationships as marital inde-
pendently of equal protection considerations that go to the issue of whether 
the state, once it recognizes some relationships as marital, has an equality-
based obligation to recognize others in the same way.   
Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry:  Same-Sex Marriage in the Af-
termath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1200 (2004).  It is true that Turner 
does not include explicit discussion of a classification-based equal protection claim, 
but that does not answer the question whether the Court’s references to marriage as 
“fundamental” ground the decision in due process or the fundamental interests 
branch of equal protection jurisprudence.  Notably, the Court relied upon Loving (as 
discussed above, a hybrid of equal protection and due process) and Zablocki (equal 
protection), suggesting to us that, in fact, it may well have been at least implicitly rely-
ing on something like an equal access theory.  The district court relied solely upon Zab-
locki for the proposition that marriage “involves fundamental human rights,” Safley v. 
Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589, 594 (W.D. Mo. 1984), while the Eighth Circuit cited to Lov-
ing, Zablocki, Skinner, and Meyer for the same assertion, Turner, 777 F.2d at 1313.  Thus, 
the formal basis for the Turner holding is unclear.  Moreover, the particular issue in 
the case turned on what level of scrutiny would be applied to prison regulations affect-
ing inmates’ constitutional rights, a question the Court never resolved because it found 
the marriage restrictions failed to pass even a rational relationship test. 
72 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (“[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ con-
stitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penolog-
ical interests.”).  
73 Id. at 95-96. 
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tional interest at stake.74  One scholar concludes that “[n]o right to 
marry case has been analyzed and decided as a ‘pure’ substantive due 
process case.”75 
Rather, the rationales underlying the Court’s decisions concern-
ing the right to marry are tangled.  And the confusion extends to the 
deeper conceptual structure of the right to marry—whether it is a li-
berty interest that all individuals enjoy in the same way, an equality in-
terest against certain types of government differentiation, or some 
combination of these.  In the rest of this Part, we identify drawbacks of 
the due process understanding of the right to civil marriage.  But first, 
we critique a more common argument against the due process theory 
raised solely in the same-sex marriage cases. 
C.  An Unpersuasive Critique 
Although we do not think due process provides the strongest 
grounding for same-sex couples’ right to marry, we disagree with 
courts as to why it fails.  Several courts have held that there is a fun-
damental due process right to marry but not a fundamental right to 
same-sex marriage.  In other words, they have defined the right with a 
high level of specificity, so that it protects only unions between one 
man and one woman.  We reject this particular limitation on the due 
process rationale, but we acknowledge that it has been successful in 
litigation.  Adopting our alternative proposal therefore allows advo-
cates to build on the widely held judicial (and societal) understanding 
of marriage as fundamentally important while avoiding what has prov-
en to be a difficult due process argument. 
When plaintiffs in same-sex marriage cases argue that the denial 
of the right to marry violates their rights under the Due Process 
Clause or state analogues, courts routinely agree that marriage is a 
“fundamental right,” a conclusion they support by citing the body of 
Supreme Court cases discussed above, as well as state decisions.76  But 
74 Moreover, concurring and dissenting opinions sometimes differed from the ma-
jority concerning the most relevant constitutional provision.  See, e.g., Zablocki v. Red-
hail, 434 U.S. 374, 391-92 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing 
that the law violates a freedom protected under the Due Process Clause, not a right to 
equal protection). 
75 Cain, supra note 6, at 33. 
76 See, e.g., Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 877 (C.D. Cal. 2005) 
(“It is undisputed there is a fundamental right to marry.” (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 95; 
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383-86; and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); as well as 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992))); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 
617 (Md. 2007) (“It is undisputed that the right to marry, in its most general sense, is a 
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although courts are willing to recognize a due process right to mar-
riage, they have also, almost uniformly, held that the right is not gen-
eral enough to encompass marriage for same-sex couples.  They rea-
son that due process rights are fundamental only if they are “deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” and they ask whether a 
right to same-sex marriage meets this standard.77  Given the way the 
question is framed, it is not surprising that the answer is consistently 
“no.”78  Judges also sometimes rely on the historically unremarkable 
fact that all of the prior decisions concerned different-sex couples79 
fundamental liberty interest that goes to the core of what the U.S. Supreme Court has 
called the right to ‘personal autonomy.’”); id. at 618 n.63 (citing the body of federal 
marriage precedents); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 207 (N.J. 2006) (“The right to 
marriage is recognized as fundamental by both our Federal and State Constitutions.” 
(citing Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383-84; and a New Jersey case, J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 
716 (N.J. 2001))); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 9 (N.Y. 2006) (“The right to 
marry is unquestionably a fundamental right.” (citing Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384; Loving, 
388 U.S. at 12; and a New York case, Cooper v. Morin, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 1194 (N.Y. 
1979))); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 976 (Wash. 2006) (“The fundamental 
right to marriage ‘is part of the fundamental right of privacy implicit in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.’” (quoting Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384)). 
77 See, e.g., Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 9 (“In deciding the validity of legislation un-
der the Due Process Clause, courts first inquire whether the legislation restricts the 
exercise of a fundamental right, one that is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.’” (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997))); see also 
Deane, 932 A.2d at 617 (“Our task in the present case, therefore, is to determine objec-
tively whether the right to marry another person of the same sex is so deeply rooted in 
the history and tradition of this State, as well as the Nation as a whole, that ‘neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed.’” (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 
721)); Lewis, 908 A.2d at 208 (“Thus we are concerned only with the question of 
whether the right to same-sex marriage is deeply rooted in this State’s history and its 
people’s collective conscience.”); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 976 (similar).  
78 See, e.g., Smelt, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 878 (“The history and tradition of the last fifty 
years have not shown the definition of marriage to include a union of two people re-
gardless of their sex.”); Deane, 932 A.2d at 627 (“[T]he laws of our State historically, 
and continue to, employ sex-specific language that reflects Maryland’s adherence to 
the traditional understanding of marriage as between a man and woman.”); Lewis, 908 
A.2d at 209 (“Although today there is a nationwide public debate raging over whether 
same-sex marriage should be authorized under the laws or constitutions of the various 
states, the framers of the 1947 New Jersey Constitution, much less the drafters of our 
marriage statutes, could not have imagined that the liberty right protected by Article I, 
Paragraph 1 embraced the right of a person to marry someone of his or her own 
sex.”); Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 9 (“The right to marry someone of the same sex, how-
ever, is not ‘deeply rooted’; it has not even been asserted until relatively recent 
times.”); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 978 (“Nor is there a tradition or history of same-sex mar-
riage in this state.  Instead, prior to and after statehood, state laws reflected the com-
mon law of marriage between a man and woman.”). 
79 See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 
458 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (“Implicit in Loving and predecessor opinions is the notion 
that marriage, often linked to procreation, is a union forged between one man and 
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and justified the right to marry partly on the ground that marriage was 
important for procreation (an argument that we take up and reject 
below).80  In sum, courts identify the due process right with a high de-
gree of specificity and then easily find that there is no longstanding 
right to marry someone of the same sex. 
Of course, there are strong arguments that the right to marry 
should be understood more generally as a right of consenting adults 
to choose a spouse or to have the state recognize intimate relation-
ships, absent a compelling justification for refusing to do so.81  In Law-
rence, the Court explained that the interest at stake in that case was 
properly understood as a right of consenting adults to sexual intima-
cy.82  It rejected as too narrow its previous characterization in Bowers v. 
Hardwick of an asserted fundamental right for “homosexuals to en-
gage in sodomy.”83  After Lawrence, to the extent that there is a due 
process right to marry, it may be appropriate to define marriage 
broadly, without limiting it by definition to a specific, historically do-
minant configuration.84  As Chief Judge Kaye of New York stated in 
one woman.”); Lewis, 908 A.2d at 210 (“We add that all of the United States Supreme 
Court cases cited by plaintiffs, Loving, Turner, and Zablocki, involved heterosexual 
couples seeking access to the right to marriage and did not implicate directly the pri-
mary question to be answered in this case.”); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 979 (“Federal deci-
sions have found the fundamental right to marry at issue only where opposite-sex mar-
riage was involved.”). 
80 To the extent that courts mention the possibility of heightened scrutiny under 
the Equal Protection Clause or state analogues, they typically reject that claim without 
separate analysis for the reasons they previously discussed in reference to the due 
process argument.  See, e.g., Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 10 (“The plaintiffs argue for strict 
scrutiny [under the Equal Protection Clause], on the ground that the legislation af-
fects their fundamental right to marry—a contention we rejected above [in analyzing 
the Due Process claims].” (citation omitted)).  In Andersen, the Washington Supreme 
Court performed its analysis under its state Equal Protection Clause analogue but re-
lied on due process standards in determining whether marriage constituted a “funda-
mental right.”  138 P.3d at 976-79.  
81 This is typically how plaintiffs in the litigation have framed the right at issue.  
See, e.g., Deane, 932 A.2d at 619 (“Appellees seek a declaration that the right to marry 
encompasses the right to marry a person of one’s choosing without interference from 
the government, even if the other person is of the same sex.”); Lewis, 908 A.2d at 206 
(“Plaintiffs maintain that the liberty interest at stake is ‘the right of every adult to 
choose whom to marry without intervention of government.’”).  
82 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).  
83 Id. at 566-67.  It is important to note, however, that Lawrence distinguished be-
tween the personal autonomy right at issue in that case and the separate issue of 
“whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homo-
sexual persons seek to enter.”  Id. at 578.  
84 See Karlan, Foreword, supra note 23, at 1451 (arguing that the Lawrence Court 
“ratchet[ed] up the level of generality at which the liberty interest was described”); 
Cass R. Sustein, Liberty After Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059, 1071-72 (2004) (arguing 
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her dissent from the court’s ruling against gay and lesbian couples, 
“fundamental rights, once recognized, cannot be denied to particular 
groups on the ground that these groups have historically been denied 
those rights.”85  Moreover, limiting the right in this way involves arbi-
trariness, as Cass Sunstein has pointed out.86  And certainly, like the 
Texas statute at stake in Lawrence, laws that selectively deny marriage 
rights to same-sex couples implicate dignity concerns.87 
Such arguments in support of a pure due process theory, however, 
have been consistently unsuccessful in same-sex marriage cases.  Due 
process claims have been raised in every state court case as well as in 
several federal venues—and yet only one state court of last resort has 
held that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry derived 
from the (state) due process provision, and even that court suggested 
that due process might not be independently sufficient to resolve the 
issue.88  Although we disagree with the rationale employed in most of 
that certain language in Lawrence undercuts the tradition-based defense of prohibitions 
on same-sex marriage). 
85 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 23 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 
86 Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2085, 2119.  Arbitrary line drawing also raises equality 
concerns, as several authors have noted, although our focus in this Section is on the 
implications of the decision for due process.  See Karlan, Foreword, supra note 23, at 
1454-55 (demonstrating “the centrality of an equal protection sensibility to the [Law-
rence] Court’s due process analysis”); Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Bor-
rowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 460-61 (2010) (showing how Lawrence bridged liberty 
and equality doctrines). 
87 See Ball, supra note 71, at 1218-19 (“There is an obligation arising from Lawrence 
for the state to respect the dignity of lesbians and gay men; [and] that obligation 
. . . will remain unfulfilled until . . . the state gives full recognition to their committed 
relationships”); R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, 
and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CAL. L. REV. 839, 898 (2008) (“[I]t seems clear 
that, at a minimum, limitations on marriage for same-sex couples violate important 
principles of dignity . . . .”). 
88 See cases cited supra notes 76-79.  The Supreme Court of California is the one 
state high court that has identified a due process–derived right to marry that applied 
to same-sex couples.  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 420 (Cal. 2008).  The Califor-
nia court relied more heavily, however, on the state’s separate constitutional protec-
tion of privacy, which had previously been recognized to include a right of personal 
autonomy applicable to marriage.  See id. at 420 (“[T]he state constitutional right to 
marry, while presumably still embodied as a component of the liberty protected by the 
state due process clause, now also clearly falls within the reach of the constitutional 
protection afforded to an individual’s interest in personal autonomy by California’s 
explicit state constitutional privacy clause.”).  In contrast to federal and most other 
state decisions, previous California decisions had emphasized a liberty interest at stake 
in the constitutionally protected right to marry.  Most notably, in Perez v. Sharp, which 
struck down the state’s anti-miscegenation law more than fifteen years before the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Loving, the California Supreme Court characterized the re-
levant issue as the freedom “to join in marriage with the person of one’s choice.”  198 
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these decisions, we think there are other, stronger reasons why even 
advocates for same-sex couples should think twice before placing too 
much weight on due process arguments. 
D.  Two Weaknesses 
We think that there are real difficulties with relying on the Due 
Process Clause alone as the source of protection for the right to mar-
riage.  First, doctrinally, due process rationales for marriage flow from a 
historical, and now obsolete, understanding of marriage as the only law-
ful means for realizing independent liberty interests in procreation and 
sexual intimacy.  Modern legal developments, which protect the rights 
of adults to engage in sexual activity outside marriage and to establish 
parent-child relationships regardless of marital status, significantly un-
dercut the due process rationale for recognizing marriage as a funda-
mental right.  Second, conceptually, liberty alone is probably the wrong 
framework for thinking about the right to marry.  Civil marriage, after 
all, is a government created and government regulated status.  The 
state could almost certainly choose to simply stop recognizing marriages 
entirely.  This possibility suggests not only that there may not be a due 
process right to civil marriage for same-sex couples but also, more radi-
cally, that there may not be a due process right to civil marriage at all.  
In this Section, we take up these critiques in turn. 
Identifying the weaknesses of a due process basis for the right to 
marry underlines the importance of the equal access approach that we 
propose.  Our key point, however, is that whether or not there is a due 
process right to civil marriage, separate analysis is required to determine 
whether selective denial of marriage rights violates equal protection. 
P.2d 17, 19 (Cal. 1948); cf. Lenhardt, supra note 87, at 844-45 (arguing that the Perez 
court’s framing of the issue provides much stronger support for marriage rights for 
same-sex couples than the Loving Court’s approach).  Subsequently, however, even the 
California Supreme Court held that—in light of the later-enacted constitutional 
amendment limiting marriage to different-sex couples—the constitutional due process 
and privacy guarantees could be satisfied by access to a legal status equivalent to mar-
riage.  Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).  Additionally, in one of the first 
“modern” challenges to different-sex marriage requirements, a lower court in Alaska 
relied in part on federal due process cases in concluding that a prohibition on same-
sex marriage could violate the state’s constitutional guarantee of a right to privacy, but 
the case was subsequently mooted by a constitutional amendment.  Brause v. Bureau of 
Vital Statistics, No. 95-6562, 1998 WL 88743, at *3-5 (Alaska Super. Ct. 1998), superseded 
by constitutional amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25.   
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1.  Marriage and Procreation 
Substantive due process cases that recognize family-related fun-
damental rights nearly always link marriage to procreation.  Among 
the first in this line was Meyer v. Nebraska, which concerned parents’ 
rights to make decisions regarding the education of their children.89  
In striking down a state law criminalizing instruction in languages 
other than English in grammar schools, the Court linked marriage to 
a substantive due process liberty interest in making decisions regard-
ing child rearing.90  Later, in Skinner, the Court again connected “mar-
riage” to “procreation” and characterized them jointly as “fundamental 
to the very existence and survival of the race.”91  Although these earlier 
cases did not concern marriage directly, the central federal marriage 
decisions, Loving and Zablocki, also explicitly associated marriage with 
procreation and child rearing.  Loving, citing Skinner, described mar-
riage as “fundamental to our very existence and survival.”92  And Zablocki 
spelled out the value of marriage by emphasizing its connection to oth-
er established fundamental due process rights: 
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the 
same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, 
child rearing, and family relationships. . . . [I]t would make little sense to 
recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life 
and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the 
foundation of the family in our society.  The woman whom [Redhail] 
desired to marry had a fundamental right to seek an abortion of their 
expected child or to bring the child into life to suffer the myriad social, 
if not economic, disabilities that the status of illegitimacy brings.  Surely, 
a decision to marry and raise the child in a traditional family setting 
must receive equivalent protection.
93
  
Turner, which concerned prison inmates, focused more explicitly on 
the tangible government benefits associated with marriage and its per-
sonal, spiritual, and societal significance.94  But even in that context, 
89 262 U.S. 390 (1923).  Earlier, in Maynard v. Hill, the Court mentioned in pass-
ing that marriage recognized “the most important relation in life.”  125 U.S. 190, 205 
(1888).     
90 See id. at 399 (holding that the liberty interest guaranteed by the Due Process 
Clause includes “the right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home and bring 
up children”); see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (asserting 
that legislation may not “unreasonably interfere[] with the liberty of parents and guar-
dians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”).  
91 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
92 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
93 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (citations omitted).  
94 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987). 
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where the liberty interests in procreation and sexual intimacy could be 
curtailed, the Court also noted that “most inmate marriages are formed 
in the expectation that they ultimately will be fully consummated.”95 
This historic linkage of marriage and procreation has been signif-
icant in the same-sex marriage context.  When determining the scope 
of the right to marry in due process analysis, many courts have relied 
on this language from Meyer, Skinner, Loving, Zablocki, and Turner to 
argue that the fundamental right to marriage protected under the 
Due Process Clause is necessarily limited to heterosexual couples be-
cause only they may procreate naturally.96  Similarly, courts have em-
ployed this focus on the ability to produce a biological child to bolster 
the so-called “responsible procreation” justification, which posits that 
states may reasonably decide to provide the benefits associated with 
marriage to heterosexual couples exclusively because only those 
couples can have children by accident.97 
But the connection between marriage and procreation has been 
undermined.  When these Supreme Court cases were decided, the 
close association between marriage and procreation made sense be-
cause marriage was, in most states, a necessary precursor for lawful 
sexual intercourse and thus lawful procreation.  Sexual intimacy out-
side of marriage, even when completely voluntary and between adults, 
95 Id. at 96. 
96 See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 363 (D.C. 1995) (Steadman, 
J., concurring) (“While plainly the marriage state involves far more, the Supreme 
Court teaches that at bottom the institution reflects considerations ‘fundamental to 
the very existence and survival of the [human] race,’ [Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541,] and 
bound up with sexual relations, procreation, childbirth and child rearing.” (citing Zab-
locki, 434 U.S. at 386)); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 619 (Md. 2007) (noting that 
prior Supreme Court cases concerning marriage, including Loving, Boddie, Zablocki, 
Turner, and Skinner, “do not represent a compelling basis to extend the fundamental 
right to include same-sex marriage . . . [because] [a]ll of the cases infer that the right 
to marry enjoys its fundamental status due to the male-female nature of the relation-
ship and/or the attendant link to fostering procreation of our species”); Andersen v. 
King County, 138 P.3d 963, 978 (Wash. 2006) (citing Skinner, Loving, and Zablocki for 
the proposition that the fundamental right to marry does not extend to same-sex 
couples in part because “[n]early all United States Supreme Court decisions declaring 
marriage to be a fundamental right expressly link marriage to fundamental rights of 
procreation, childbirth, abortion, and child rearing”); cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186, 190-91 (1986) (“[N]one of the rights announced in [earlier privacy cases includ-
ing Meyer, Skinner, Loving, Griswold, and Eisenstadt] bears any resemblance to the 
claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy . . . [because] 
[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and ho-
mosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated . . . .”), overruled by Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
97 See infra subsection III.E.1. 
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violated criminal bans on fornication.98  Thus, at that time, the con-
nection that the Court drew was logical; a liberty interest in procrea-
tion or child rearing was quite limited if there was not a related liberty 
to enter into marriage.  Even Griswold, which recognized a due process 
liberty interest in choosing to use contraceptives, and thus implicitly 
in choosing to have nonprocreative sexual intercourse, grounded that 
right in a concern for marital privacy.99  By 1978, when Zablocki was de-
cided, the link had weakened some.  Nonetheless, the Court’s reason-
ing in Zablocki—“it would make little sense to recognize a right to pri-
vacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to 
the decision” to marry since marriage is “the only relationship in 
which the State . . . allows sexual regulations legally to take place”—
was derivative.100  The Court did not articulate an independent basis 
for recognizing the right to marry as a liberty interest under the Due 
Process Clause, and Zablocki itself was an equal protection case. 
In fact, the Supreme Court played a key role in weakening the 
substantive legal links between marriage, procreation, and private 
sexual decisionmaking.  In 1972, the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird de-
parted from the focus on “marital” privacy that had motivated Gris-
wold; it held instead that unmarried persons had an equal right to 
choose to use contraceptives.101  Later, in Lawrence, the Court went fur-
98 Today, while some criminal fornication laws remain on the books, prosecutions 
are extremely rare and might well violate modern constitutional principles.  See, e.g., 
Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 371 (Va. 2005) (applying the reasoning in Lawrence to 
strike down a state anti-fornication statute). 
99 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred 
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?  The very 
idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”). 
100 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386; see also supra text accompanying notes 66-69.  As noted 
above, Turner does suggest several other grounds for recognizing the fundamental im-
portance of marriage.  See supra text accompanying note 73.  Notably, however, most of 
the factors identified by the court—government benefits and public recognition—are 
closer to other fundamental interests recognized under the Equal Protection Clause 
than to the “privacy” rationales that justify other due process family rights.  See discus-
sion infra Part III. 
101 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).  Eisenstadt was formally decided on equal protection 
grounds.  The Court claimed that it did not need to reach the question whether the 
statute at issue—which permitted married persons but not unmarried persons to access 
contraceptives for the purpose of preventing pregnancy—impinged on the fundamen-
tal liberty interests identified in Griswold because it held that the distinction failed to 
satisfy even rational basis review.  Id. at 447 n.7.  Because rational basis review is usually 
extremely deferential, it makes sense to suspect that the law’s invalidation had some-
thing to do with the status of the right.  It is therefore possible to think of Eisenstadt as 
a case concerning the unequal allocation of a fundamental interest.  See, e.g., Cain, su-
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ther and held that private consensual sexual activity by two individuals 
of the same sex—conduct that was by definition both nonprocreative 
and (at the time of Lawrence) nonmarital—merited due process pro-
tection.102  Of course, many individuals may choose to have sexual re-
lations or children only within marriage, but the government can no 
longer use criminal law to punish individuals who make different 
choices.  Thus, under modern constitutional principles, a right to enter 
marriage is no longer necessary to protect the separate due process li-
berty interests associated with choices regarding sexual intimacy or 
child rearing. 
In the law of parent-child relationships, a related evolution has 
occurred.  At common law and under state law throughout much of 
the nineteenth century, children who were conceived outside of mar-
riage were branded as bastards.103  Even if the father was known, child-
ren had no claim for support or right of inheritance unless they were 
legitimized.104  Even more surprising to modern sensibilities, nonma-
rital children sometimes had no claim to support from their mothers; 
nor did unwed mothers have a clear claim to custody of their child-
ren.105  Thus, historically, marriage was essential to ensure that child-
ren received support from their parents as well as to permit parents to 
claim a right to care and custody of their children. 
During the nineteenth century, states began to enact laws recog-
nizing that so-called illegitimate children were part of their mothers’ 
families.106  Some states also imposed support obligations on nonma-
rital fathers.  However, as late as 1971, Texas and Idaho still denied 
pra note 6, at 34 (arguing that “Eisenstadt belongs in the ‘fundamental rights’ branch of 
equal protection cases”). 
 Notably, the Court implied that the liberty interest at issue was the same for married 
persons and single persons:  “[W]hatever the rights of the individual to access to contra-
ceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and married alike . . . [because] 
[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, 
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally af-
fecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”  Id. at 453 (first em-
phasis added).  The Court did, however, also suggest that states could permissibly crimi-
nalize sex between unmarried persons under fornication laws.  Id. at 449-50. 
102 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
103 See generally, e.g., John Witte, Jr., Ishmael’s Bane:  The Sin and Crime of Illegitimacy 
Reconsidered, 5 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 327 (2003) (reviewing the history of the treatment 
of illegitimacy in early modern Anglo-American common law and early American sta-
tutory schemes). 
104 See id. at 334. 
105 See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH:  LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 197, 207 (1985). 
106 See id. 
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nonmarital children any right to support from their fathers, and Vir-
ginia only imposed obligations if the father voluntarily and formally 
recognized his child.107  Even many states that imposed support obliga-
tions failed to recognize any right by a biological father to decisions 
related to the care or custody of a nonmarital child.108 
More recent developments have moved the law sharply away from 
the marriage-focused determination of parental rights and responsi-
bilities.  In Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that biological 
fathers had a protectable interest in their nonmarital children; subse-
quent decisions further developed biological fathers’ rights, at least 
when the fathers had taken steps to develop relationships with the 
children.109  The Court has also held that state distinctions between 
marital and nonmarital children in the distribution of benefits or 
availability of specific remedies violate the Equal Protection Clause.110 
Additional statutory reforms further dismantled the legal infirmi-
ties that had traditionally accompanied illegitimate status.  Now, un-
der the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) and commonly under other 
state laws, both parent-child relationships and parent-child support 
obligations are established largely independent of any consideration 
of marital relationships.111  (This is one of the weaknesses of the so-
called “responsible procreation” justification for different-sex mar-
107 See HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY:  LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 22-23 (1971). 
108 See id. at 29-30. 
109 See 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (requiring procedural safeguards before terminat-
ing a nonmarital biological father’s relationship with his children).  See generally, e.g., 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (reviewing doctrine recognizing a due 
process–protected liberty interest in a nonmarital biological father’s relationship with 
his children, although permitting a marital father’s interest to trump a nonmarital bio-
logical father’s interests in certain circumstances). 
110 See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173-76 (1972) (holding 
that a denial of workers’ compensation benefits to unacknowledged nonmarital child-
ren in favor of the father’s marital children violated the Equal Protection Clause); 
Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 76 (1968) (striking down a law 
barring a mother from recovering in an action based on the wrongful death of her il-
legitimate child); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (overturning a law barring 
an illegitimate child from recovering in an action based on the wrongful death of his 
or her mother). 
111 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (2000) (amended 2002), available at http:// 
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upa/final2002.htm.  The UPA preserves the ma-
rital presumption that a child born to a married woman is the child of her husband, id. § 
204(a)(1), but permits the presumption to be rebutted in an action brought within two 
years of the birth by the presumed father, the mother, or any other person,  id. § 607. 
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riage requirements; whether or not bound by marriage to the mother 
of a child, the father is legally responsible for providing support.112) 
Social norms around procreation have changed as well.  It is in-
creasingly common, and thus considerably less stigmatizing, for child-
ren to be born to unmarried parents.  A recent study by the Centers 
for Disease Control found that almost forty percent of all babies deli-
vered in the United States were born to unmarried women.113  And of 
course, modern advancements in artificial reproductive technology 
have dramatically expanded possibilities for procreation (for both dif-
ferent-sex and same-sex couples) without heterosexual sexual inter-
course.114  These developments highlight that the distinct liberty inter-
ests in procreation and child rearing no longer serve as a convincing 
justification for marriage as a due process liberty interest. 
2.  The Structure of the Right 
Thinking about civil marriage as a liberty right protected by due 
process does not fit the structure of the right very well, and it runs up 
against the fact that civil marriage could be abolished altogether with-
out constitutional difficulty. 
According to proponents of the due process approach, the “liber-
ty” guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes a right to 
marry in a legal ceremony.115  Yet in other contexts where due process 
guarantees freedom to make a range of personal, intimate decisions 
related to the family, it protects against excessive government interfe-
112 There are many other grounds on which to challenge the responsible procrea-
tion argument, most notably that excluding same-sex couples from marriage in no way 
affects the state’s interest in encouraging heterosexual couples who may accidentally 
bear children to marry.  See infra subsection III.E.1.  For other critiques of the respon-
sible procreation argument, see, for example, Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage 
as a Message:  Same-Sex Couples and the Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. &  
HUMAN. 1 (2009), and Edward Stein, The Accidental Procreation Argument for Withholding 
Legal Recognition for Same-Sex Relationships, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) 
(draft on file with authors).  
113 STEPHANIE J. VENTURA, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, NCHS DATA BRIEF 
NO. 18, CHANGING PATTERNS OF NONMARITAL CHILDBEARING IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db18.pdf. 
114 See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies:  Invisible Barriers, Indel-
ible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 18, 25-35 (2008) (discussing the growing 
use of artificial insemination in the United States). 
115 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:  FROM 
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 123-30 (1996) (arguing that due process, 
along with equal protection, could ground a constitutional right to marry for same-sex 
couples). 
1402 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 1375 
rence.  Think of choices regarding child rearing,116 sexual intimacy,117 
contraceptive use,118 terminating a pregnancy,119 or living with mem-
bers of an extended family.120  A certain level of regulation over some 
of these decisions is permitted when necessary to further independent 
state objectives.  Thus, for example, the liberty interest in making 
child-rearing decisions does not preclude criminal or civil penalties 
for excessive corporal punishment; the liberty interest in choosing to 
use contraceptives does not preclude generally applicable regulation 
of prescription medicine; and the liberty interest in choosing to ter-
minate a pregnancy does not preclude consideration of the state’s in-
terest in protecting the independent potential life of a fetus.  Howev-
er, the right at issue in each case exists entirely independent of the 
state and protects against unduly burdensome regulation.  In other 
words, there is no direct state action involved in how one raises one’s 
children, engages in sexual intimacy, uses contraceptives, terminates a 
pregnancy, or chooses with whom to live. 
Thus, these substantive due process rights (at least arguably) are 
not burdened when the state refuses to aid or facilitate access to them, 
under current law.  According to the Court, the government need not 
support a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy, even though 
that right is constitutionally protected from excessive regulation.121  
Likewise, parents have a due process right to control the education of 
their children, although they do not have a corresponding right to 
government funding of those choices.122  Getting married in a civil 
116 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
117 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
118 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (unmarried couples); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (married couples). 
119 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
120 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
121 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (upholding a federal law banning 
the use of federal Medicaid funds for most abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 
480-81 (1977) (upholding a state law that granted Medicaid benefits for childbirth but 
not for nontherapeutic abortions); cf. Robin L. West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice:  
De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394 (2009) (arguing that a cost of 
the liberty-derived status of abortion rights is that it absolves the state of a responsibility 
to provide support for pregnancy or parenting).  
122 See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973) (holding that even though 
parents have a constitutional right to send their children to private school, they do not 
have a right to equal government support of private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (holding that even though a state could not forbid private schools 
from teaching foreign languages before the eighth grade, it could exclude German 
classes from its public school curriculum); cf. Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. 
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ceremony is different from these other family-related activities.  It is 
not possible to wed in this sense without state involvement because the 
state itself creates the status.123  As the Massachusetts high court put it, 
“[T]here are three partners to every civil marriage:  two willing spous-
es and an approving State.”124  Civil marriage entails a host of state and 
federal benefits, as well as significant legally enforced obligations.  
Cass Sunstein therefore calls civil marriage a “government-run licensing 
system.”125  If that is so, it makes little sense to think of entering a civil 
marriage as an activity that could be protected by a right to be free from 
undue government interference.  Additionally, marriage serves as a 
public signifier of social status,126 and in this respect, too, it is distinct 
from the interests protected by these other family rights.127 
Our conception becomes clearer if you think of the right to marry 
in two parts:  (1) the ability of consenting adults to join together in a 
private ceremony, which may well be protected by a liberty right against 
government interference, and (2) the ability to have the government 
recognize that union with an official license that provides access to im-
portant legal rights and obligations, as well as expressive benefits.  We 
contend that the second does not involve a typical liberty interest.128 
According to the first component, private institutions, religious 
and otherwise, have a constitutionally protected right to conduct mar-
PA. L. REV. 1263, 1282-83 (2008) (drawing on those cases to argue against a constitu-
tional right to equal government support of religious exercise).  
123 Of course, marriage itself predates government licensing; throughout much of 
history, marriage was regulated through societal conventions (that arguably helped 
establish government entities), private contract, and religious law. See generally, e.g., Ab-
rams & Brooks, supra note 112, at 1, 6-8 (discussing how the concept of marriage rela-
tionships predates state regulation of marriage); Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1766-67 (2005) (“The state has been a relative latecomer in the 
regulation of marriage”).  
124 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003). 
125 Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2082. 
126 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, A World Without Marriage, 41 FAM. L.Q. 537, 558-62 
(2007) (examining marriage’s privileged social status). 
127 Strong arguments may be made that some of these other fundamental rights 
raise significant equality concerns as well.  See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original 
Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 292 & n.3 (2007) (arguing for an equal citizenship 
or antisubordination approach to the right to terminate a pregnancy, and citing others 
who have made similar equality arguments). 
128 In this way, we disagree with the Goodridge court, which thought that the fact 
that a state could abolish civil marriage altogether cut not only against a due process 
analysis, but also against an equal access approach.  798 N.E.2d at 957 n.14 (“The 
‘right to marry’ is different from rights deemed ‘fundamental’ for equal protection and 
due process purposes because the State could, in theory, abolish all civil marriage . . . .” 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)).  
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riage ceremonies, and the state may not interfere without a compel-
ling justification.129  Those ceremonies may be conducted largely in-
dependent of whether and how the state recognizes marriages.130  
Thus, state laws that permit marriages between same-sex couples do 
not require private religious or secular institutions to conduct or rec-
ognize those marriages.131  Conversely, states that do not provide civil 
marriage for same-sex couples presumptively must allow individual re-
ligious institutions and secular institutions to perform them.  Such 
private choices are protected by due process and, in many cases, by 
the First Amendment.  Significantly, however, such ceremonies do not 
give same-sex couples any of the legal benefits that flow from civil 
marriage, and they may have less expressive impact as well. 
The second component—the ability to wed in a government recog-
nized ceremony—is quite different from the private liberty component.  
It requires government action, and, as discussed in Part III, it is best 
protected by the fundamental interests branch of equal protection law. 
129 See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2095-96 (arguing that a state move to abolish private 
efforts to create the expressive equivalent of state-sponsored marriage “would be uncons-
titutional, under the Free Exercise Clause, as applied to religious institutions,” and that it 
would also be invalid as to nonreligious unions under the Due Process Clause). 
 We recognize that some state laws prohibit not only certain civil marriages, such as 
those for gay and lesbian couples, but also criminalize some private marriages, such as 
those between multiple spouses or close family members.  Although such laws are 
beyond the scope of our discussion here, which is focused on civil marriage, an impli-
cation of our analysis is that laws restricting at least some types of private marriages 
may well require strong state justification if the right to private marriage bears a close 
enough resemblance to other family-related due process rights.    
130 See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 905-06 (Iowa 2009) (“[O]ur consti-
tutional principles . . . require that the state recognize both opposite-sex and same-sex 
civil marriage.  Religious doctrine and views contrary to this principle remain unaf-
fected, and people can continue to associate with the religion that best reflects their 
views.”).  In our conclusion that institutions could continue to make their own deter-
mination whether to celebrate marriages for same-sex couples, we are thinking of 
churches, synagogues, mosques, secular humanist organizations, and similar institu-
tions.  It would be another matter, of course, if institutions that typically do not cele-
brate marriages sought to define marriage more restrictively than the state.  For in-
stance, if private employers chose to recognize only certain marriages for the purpose 
of distributing benefits, antidiscrimination rules might properly come into play; such 
actions might also violate other constitutional or statutory provisions, such as Title VII 
or state or local employment discrimination laws.   
 We also note that religious institutions may not need to rely on due process be-
cause of the ready availability of free exercise arguments.  See generally SAME-SEX MAR-
RIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:  EMERGING CONFLICTS, at xii (Douglas Laycock et al. 
eds., 2008). 
131 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37 (“Each religious organization, associa-
tion, or society has exclusive control over its own religious doctrine, policy, teachings, 
and beliefs regarding who may marry within their faith.”).  
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One way to appreciate the disjunction between a due process con-
ception and this second component of the right to marry is to consid-
er a situation in which a government decided to get out of the mar-
riage business altogether.  Although state and federal courts assert 
that marriage is “unquestionably” a fundamental right, they also 
sometimes suggest that the state could choose simply to stop perform-
ing civil marriages.132  Commentators and political actors likewise 
make such suggestions with regularity.133  In fact, abolishing civil mar-
riage is increasingly proposed as a “solution” to the same-sex marriage 
difficulty:  the state could simply permit both same-sex and different-
sex couples to form civil unions, leaving religious and secular institu-
tions to resolve the thorny issue of who may marry.134 
But these proposals raise a puzzle.  They necessarily rely on an in-
tuition—often unvoiced—that abolishing a right to civil marriage 
would not violate constitutional rights.  We agree.  Yet if a liberty in-
terest in civil marriage really were guaranteed by substantive due 
process, a proposal to abolish it would seem to raise serious constitu-
132 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 432 (Cal. 2008).  The California Su-
preme Court, the only court to hold that failure to permit same-sex couples to marry 
violates a state due process provision, offered a detailed assessment of the complexity 
of these issues.  In the case that overturned the state’s statutory different-sex marriage 
requirements, the court suggested that the right to marry included a positive right to 
state recognition of certain intimate relationships, such as marriage, and that the state 
could not simply abolish marriage.  Id. at 426 & n.42.  Later in the opinion, however, 
the court suggested that a potential remedy for the constitutional violation could be to 
substitute a separate, uniform designation that would apply to both same-sex and dif-
ferent-sex couples.  Id. at 453; see also Melissa Murray, Equal Rites and Equal Rights, 96 
CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1399-1401 (2008) (discussing this possibility).  Notably, in Strauss v. 
Horton, the court subsequently held that a constitutional amendment that limited mar-
riage to different-sex couples was constitutionally permissible, in large part because 
same-sex couples had access to the rights and obligations of marriage through a sepa-
rate domestic partnership status.  207 P.3d 48, 74-77 (Cal. 2009).  
133 For academic perspectives, see, for example, MARRIAGE PROPOSALS:  QUES-
TIONING A LEGAL STATUS (Anita Bernstein ed., 2006); Cain, supra note 6; Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage:  The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil Marriage, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1161 (2006).  The approach is gaining at least some political trac-
tion.  See, e.g., Lisa Rein, Bill Would End Civil Marriage, Create Domestic Partnerships, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2008, at B4 (discussing a bill proposed in Maryland to replace 
“marriage” with family “partnerships” that would be available to both different- and 
same-sex couples). 
134 This solution would solve the equal protection problem we believe lies in creat-
ing separate statuses, such as civil unions, solely for same-sex couples while continuing 
to permit different-sex couples to marry.  See infra Section III.E.  However, we take no 
position on whether it would be preferable to move toward civil unions for everyone or 
to permit both same-sex and different-sex couples to marry civilly.  For a thoughtful 
consideration of some of the pros and cons, see Scott, supra note 126, at 537, 551-65. 
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tional concerns.  After all, a complete denial of access to civil marriage 
would impose a maximum burden on the relevant liberty interest.  It 
is difficult to see how the state could conceivably justify elimination of 
civil marriage under the standard customarily used to assess depriva-
tions of due process—whether the denial of the right is narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling government interest. 
Nonetheless, there is reason to think that this intuition is sound—
namely, that a state could constitutionally abolish its civil marriage sys-
tem without offending the Constitution so long as it denied access to mar-
riage for everyone.135  This thought experiment suggests that the right 
to civil marriage is primarily grounded in the Equal Protection 
Clause rather than the Due Process Clause.  As we show in Part III, 
our equal access analysis appropriately synthesizes both the sense 
that civil marriage is of fundamental importance and that it could be 
abolished altogether. 
Others have noted these differences between marriage and other 
due process–protected family rights and have proposed creative theo-
retical justifications for including marriage among them.  For exam-
ple, David Meyer, looking at the public significance of marriage, ar-
gues that privacy should be understood counterintuitively to include a 
right to public recognition of family relationships,136 and Carlos Ball 
argues that privacy includes positive as well as negative rights.137  We 
agree with these scholars that, despite the delinking of civil marriage 
from decisions regarding procreation and child rearing, the institu-
tion remains fundamentally important and the Supreme Court has 
correctly held that it merits constitutional protection.  However, as 
135 See Cain, supra note 6, at 42-43 (concluding that civil marriage could be ab-
olished consistent with the Constitution).  It is possible to imagine an argument that 
eliminating civil marriage would violate substantive due process because access to gov-
ernment-recognized marriage has become embedded in the American understanding 
of intimate relationships.  Yet it would be difficult for that argument to succeed, par-
ticularly in the context of a state that had generated enough public support to abolish 
civil marriage through the democratic process.  Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2094-95.  Suns-
tein therefore rejects the due process argument for civil marriage and concludes that 
“whatever the content of the right to marry, it does not include a right that the state 
maintain an official scheme for recognizing and legitimating marriage.”  Id. at 2095.       
136 David D. Meyer, A Privacy Right to Public Recognition of Family Relationships?  The 
Cases of Marriage and Adoption, 51 VILL. L. REV. 891, 892 (2006).  Meyer recognizes the 
“basic irony” in the claim, and that it would “push constitutional privacy onto distinctly 
different ground,” but presents it as a way of reconciling otherwise confusing 
precedent.  Id. 
137 Ball, supra note 71, at 1203-07 (arguing that even if the Due Process Clause 
primarily protects negative rights, “the fundamental right to marry stands as an impor-
tant exception”). 
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explained fully in Part III, we think that the better way to resolve the 
tension between equal access to civil marriage and other due process 
rights is to recognize that the former is more properly located in the 
fundamental interest branch of equal protection law. 
II.  CLASSIFICATION-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 
Before turning to equal access, we address the dominant equal 
protection claim in same-sex marriage cases, namely, that laws prohi-
biting gay men and lesbians from marrying impermissibly classify on 
the basis of sexual orientation.  We conclude that this argument has 
serious limitations, although its drawbacks have more to do with 
pragmatics than principles. 
Basic equal protection law will be familiar to most readers.  Gov-
ernment laws and policies must treat similarly situated individuals 
alike.138  The government may, however, enact legislation that ac-
knowledges relevant differences between individuals.139  Most of the 
time, legislative judgments regarding necessary distinctions receive de-
ference.140  But certain classifications are presumptively disallowed on 
the ground that they are likely to be illegitimate, and therefore they 
must be justified by the state, with doubts and ambiguities resolved 
against the government.  Under the Federal Constitution, race, na-
tional origin, religion, and alienage are among the classifications that 
must be justified by a compelling state interest under the strict scruti-
ny standard of review; classifications on the basis of sex receive a less 
demanding form of heightened review, intermediate scrutiny.141  Reg-
ulations that do not employ suspect categories are presumptively con-
stitutional and will be upheld so long as they are rationally related to a 
138 E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) 
(“[A]ll persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”). 
139 See, e.g., Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940) (“The Constitution does not 
require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though 
they were the same.”). 
140 See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (“The general rule is that legislation is pre-
sumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state interest.”).  
141 Id.  Religion has been included in the list of suspect classifications, albeit in dic-
ta.  See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (cha-
racterizing as presumptively invalid classifications “drawn upon inherently suspect dis-
tinctions such as race, religion, or alienage”). 
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legitimate state interest.142  Most state courts employ a similar tiered 
structure of review.143 
In same-sex marriage cases, plaintiffs typically argue that classifica-
tions on the basis of sexual orientation should be presumptively 
invalid; in other words, they argue that sexual orientation should be 
recognized as a suspect classification.  Courts look at a variety of fac-
tors in determining whether a given classification must be justified by 
a compelling state interest.  Factors that are sometimes (but not al-
ways) considered include whether there has been a history of discrim-
ination against the members of the given class, whether the classifica-
tion at issue is generally irrelevant to a person’s ability to participate 
or contribute to society, whether the classification is based on an im-
mutable characteristic, and whether it identifies a group that is a nu-
merical minority or is otherwise relatively politically powerless.144 
As a threshold matter, some states have challenged plaintiffs’ con-
tention that different-sex marriage requirements classify on the basis 
of sexual orientation at all.  They argue that the statutes at issue do 
not explicitly refer to sexual orientation but instead simply provide 
that men must marry women and that women must marry men.  Fur-
ther, they sometimes note that a gay man or a lesbian woman is not 
treated differently from a straight man or woman:  all people who seek 
to marry face the same restrictions, regardless of their sexual orienta-
tion.  However, courts have uniformly found these arguments uncon-
vincing.  They have recognized the reality that gays and lesbians are 
treated differently from heterosexuals in one critical respect, namely, 
their ability to marry their chosen partners.145 
142 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. 
143 See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 423 (Conn. 2008) 
(adopting federal equal protection methodology for adjudication under the state 
equality provision). 
144 See, e.g., id. at 461 (applying these factors to conclude that discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation merits heightened scrutiny); Varnum v. Brien, 763 
N.W.2d 862, 889-96 (Iowa 2009) (same).  But see, e.g., Andersen v. King County, 138 
P.3d 963, 975 (Wash. 2006) (holding that sexual orientation is not a suspect class be-
cause it is not immutable and “gay and lesbian persons are not powerless but, instead, 
exercise increasing political power”).  
145 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 440-41 (Cal. 2008) (“By limiting mar-
riage to opposite-sex couples, the marriage statutes, realistically viewed, operate clearly 
and directly to impose different treatment on gay individuals because of their sexual 
orientation.”); see also, e.g., Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 875 n.20 
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (noting that different-sex marriage restrictions implicitly classify on 
the basis of sexual orientation); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 431 n.24 (same); Varnum, 763 
N.W.2d at 885 (same); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 605 (Md. 2007) (same); Her-
nandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 11 (N.Y. 2006) (same). 
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On the more substantive question of whether the compelling in-
terest test applies to laws that classify on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion, results have been considerably more mixed.  High courts in Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, and Iowa all held that discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation received heightened scrutiny (“strict” scrutiny in 
California and an intermediate level in Iowa and Connecticut), and 
they went on to find that the rationales offered in support of prohibit-
ing marriage for same-sex couples were inadequate to survive such 
scrutiny.146  Consequently, they ordered the states at issue to permit 
same-sex couples to marry.  (California subsequently passed a voter 
referendum that superseded this decision by amending the state con-
stitution.147)  And the highest courts in New Jersey and Vermont, 
which apply flexible balancing tests rather than rigid tiers of scrutiny, 
each held that the state rationales were inadequate to justify exclusion 
of same-sex couples from the rights and benefits of marriage,148 al-
though each court allowed the state to satisfy its obligations by creat-
ing a separate legal status.149 
Without explicitly applying any form of heightened scrutiny, the 
Massachusetts high court held that state rationales were inadequate to 
justify denying marriage to same-sex couples.150  The Massachusetts 
holding was somewhat akin to recent Supreme Court decisions con-
cerning rights for gays and lesbians that have invalidated regulations 
without specifying a standard of review.  In Romer v. Evans, the Court 
struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment that specifically 
prohibited state or local protections against discrimination on the ba-
146 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442-44, 446-52; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 432-481; 
Varnum, 963 N.W.2d at 889-904.   
147 See CAL. CONST. art I, § 7.5 (“Only marriage between a man and a woman is va-
lid or recognized in California.”); see also Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 
2009) (holding that the constitutional amendment is permissible but that marriages of 
same-sex couples prior to its enactment remain valid). 
148 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 217-21 (N.J. 2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 
884-86 (Vt. 1999). 
149 See Lewis, 908 A.2d at 222 (“We will not presume that a difference in name 
alone is of constitutional magnitude.”); Baker, 744 A.2d at 886 (“We hold only that 
plaintiffs are entitled . . . to obtain the same benefits and protections afforded by Ver-
mont law to married opposite-sex couples.”). 
150 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (hold-
ing that the marriage statute did not survive rational basis review).  In Goodridge, the 
court did not resolve whether the constitutional infirmity could be fixed by providing 
the rights and benefits of marriage through some other status, but the court ultimately 
held that the state could not limit “marriage” to different-sex couples while creating 
“civil unions” for same-sex couples.  Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 
565, 572 (Mass. 2004). 
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sis of sexual orientation.151  Similarly, the Court’s recent decision in 
Lawrence did not explicitly apply strict scrutiny.152  Because these deci-
sions are arguably hard to square with the great deference generally 
shown to legislative decisionmaking under rational basis review, some 
commentators contend that the Court is moving towards a more 
searching review of laws that classify on the basis of sexual orientation 
without formally announcing heightened scrutiny.153 
But in the marriage context, Massachusetts is virtually alone in 
striking down a different-sex marriage law under ordinary review.  
Many courts, including the highest courts of New York,154 Washing-
ton,155 and Maryland,156 as well as an intermediate court in Indiana,157 
have held that heightened scrutiny is not applicable and that, under 
ordinary review, states may choose to limit marriage to different-sex 
couples.  Federal courts that have considered the question have like-
wise held that heightened scrutiny is not applicable and that different-
sex marriage requirements are permissible.158  As discussed more fully 
in Section III.E below, these courts emphasize that rational basis re-
view is highly deferential and, accordingly, that admittedly overbroad 
151 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
152 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (concluding that “liberty pro-
tected by the Constitution” includes the liberty for adults to make choices regarding 
intimate conduct with another person within the home); id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (“[N]owhere does the Court’s opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a ‘fun-
damental right’ under the Due Process Clause; nor does it subject the Texas law to the 
standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy 
were a ‘fundamental right.’”). 
153 See William D. Araiza, New Groups and Old Doctrine:  Rethinking Congressional Pow-
er to Enforce the Equal Protection Clause, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (ma-
nuscript at 3 & n.12, 18 & n.122) (citing cases), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1461447. 
154 See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 11 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that, at least as 
applied to marriage, classification on the basis of sexual orientation does not require 
heightened scrutiny because it relates to the state’s legitimate interests in serving 
children). 
155 See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006) (holding that 
sexual orientation classifications did not require heightened scrutiny because plaintiffs 
had not established sexual orientation as an immutable trait). 
156 See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 609-14 (Md. 2007) (holding that heightened 
scrutiny is not applicable because lesbians and gay men are not politically powerless). 
157 See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 21-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (applying ra-
tional basis review to a marriage statute on the ground that, under the Indiana Consti-
tution, all classifications are subject to rational basis review). 
158 See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308-09 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (apply-
ing rational basis review and upholding DOMA). 
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and underinclusive justifications can suffice, even though they may 
strike many as far-fetched. 
Same-sex couples also routinely argue that different-sex marriage 
requirements improperly discriminate on the basis of sex.  Plaintiffs 
typically assert both that the statutes impermissibly use sex-based clas-
sifications and that they tend to rely upon and thus reinforce sex ste-
reotypes.159  In one of the earliest modern challenges to different-sex 
marriage requirements, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the 
use of sex-based classifications in marriage statutes triggered strict 
scrutiny under that state’s equal rights amendment and remanded to 
the trial court for consideration of the state’s justifications.160  More 
recent cases, however, have consistently rejected the sex discrimina-
tion argument, generally on the ground that different-sex marriage 
statutes apply equally to men and to women.161 
We think that the arguments in favor of heightened scrutiny on 
the basis of sexual orientation are strong in theory.  But, as noted 
above, many courts have already held that classifications on the basis 
of sexual orientation do not trigger heightened scrutiny.  Realistically 
speaking, we recognize that courts—federal courts in particular—are 
159 See generally Deborah A. Widiss et al., Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex 
Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 461, 469-72 (2007) (discussing plain-
tiffs’ briefing in recent same-sex marriage cases).  Theorists have long claimed that dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation should be recognized as a form of sex 
discrimination.  See, e.g., Andrew Koppleman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and 
Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994) (arguing that discrimination 
against homosexuals is sex discrimination because it perpetuates gender hierarchy); 
Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187 
(claiming that animus against homosexual behavior preserves and reinforces the social 
meaning attached to gender).  More recently, commentators have considered such sex 
discrimination claims specifically with respect to denial of marriage rights to same-sex 
couples.  See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action?  Searching for Gender Talk in 
the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97 (2005) (exploring the “gender 
talk” that underlies arguments for retaining traditional marriage restrictions and the ab-
sence of a sex discrimination perspective in the debate over same-sex marriage); Widiss, 
supra, at 479-87.  But see Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian 
and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471 (2001) (arguing that the sex discrimination argu-
ment misstates the primary harm of discrimination against gay men and lesbians).    
160 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64-67 (Haw. 1993).  A subsequent constitutional 
amendment rendered the ongoing appeal moot.  See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (permit-
ting the legislature to limit marriage to different-sex couples); Baehr v. Miike, No. 
20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, at *8 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999) (holding that the amendment 
rendered the ongoing appeal moot). 
161 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 435-39 (Cal. 2008); Conaway v. 
Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 585-602 (Md. 2007); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. 
2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999); Andersen v. King County, 138 
P.3d 963, 988 (Wash. 2006) (all rejecting the sex discrimination argument).   
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reluctant to announce new suspect classes.162  The Supreme Court ar-
guably avoided that sort of announcement in Lawrence precisely because 
it feared the consequences for a range of laws, including, but not li-
mited to, laws concerning marriage.163  We also see considerable merit 
in the claim that different-sex marriage requirements trigger heigh-
tened scrutiny under sex discrimination principles, particularly since 
many of the rationales offered by states reflect sex-based stereotypes, as 
one of us has argued previously.164  Again, though, few courts have been 
persuaded.  And, although strong arguments can be made that differ-
ent-sex marriage requirements fail to satisfy even rational basis review, it 
seems unlikely that many courts will follow Massachusetts’s lead and 
strike down different-sex marriage requirements under that deferential 
standard.  We believe that equal access offers a strong alternative for 
challenging the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage. 
III.  EQUAL ACCESS 
In this Part we show how equal access provides stronger support 
for a right to marry than the alternatives.  Even though a right to civil 
marriage may not be guaranteed as a matter of due process, and even 
assuming that classifying on the basis of sexual orientation is not inhe-
rently suspect, the government presumptively may not exclude gay 
men and lesbians once it decides to offer marriage licenses to the 
public.  In Section III.A, we show how the Supreme Court arguably 
162 See Araiza, supra note 153 (manuscript at 3) (“[T]he Court has apparently 
sworn off creating new suspect classes, preferring instead to resolve new equal [protec-
tion] problems by varying the actual scrutiny accorded under the rational basis test but 
thereby essentially freezing the current doctrinal status of all non-suspect classes.” (ci-
tation omitted)). 
163  Karlan, for example, has made the following argument: 
 By contrast to the incremental possibilities of fundamental rights/due 
process–based strict scrutiny, suspect classification/equal protection–based 
strict scrutiny seems far more binary:  either a group is entitled to heightened 
scrutiny across the board or it isn’t.  The Court may have feared that if it 
struck down Texas’s statute on the ground that it violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to treat gay people differently from straight people, this would re-
quire it to invalidate all laws that treat gay and straight couples differently, the 
most obvious of which are laws restricting the right to marry.  
Karlan, Foreword, supra note 23, at 1460.  Now that federal courts find themselves con-
fronted with the marriage question, analogous fears about other laws may drive them 
away from classification-based analyses. 
164 See Widiss et al., supra note 159, at 487-98 (arguing that common justifications prof-
fered for different-sex marriage requirements, such as a necessity for different sex role 
models for children or “responsible procreation,” impermissibly rely on sex stereotypes).   
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has already established that selectively denying access to civil marriage 
presumptively violates equal protection.  We also compare civil mar-
riage to other government programs that likewise implicate funda-
mental interests for equal protection purposes—notably voting and 
court access.  Section III.B argues that equal access best captures the 
liberty and equality interests at play, while Section III.C shows how our 
approach blends considerations of traditionalism and progressivism.  
Section III.D sets some limits to our proposal, and, finally, Section 
III.E applies our framework and concludes that government interests 
in different-sex marriage laws cannot overcome the presumption of 
unconstitutionality that the equal access approach imposes. 
A.  Marriage as a Fundamental Interest 
Our argument is that the government presumptively must allow 
equal access to any program of civil marriage that it chooses to create.  
Equal access does not require the government to create an institution 
of officially recognized marriage, and it does not prevent officials from 
dismantling the existing system.  What it does demand is that lawmakers 
who decide to offer civil marriage must administer that program even-
handedly, or else bear the burden of justifying exclusions.  Because 
access to civil marriage plays an important role in American society and 
because exclusion from that institution, especially when based on 
membership in a recognized social or status group, has implications for 
equal citizenship, states must justify selective denial of marriage rights. 
Longstanding doctrine holds that courts will look carefully at laws 
or policies that interfere substantially and unequally with interests that 
are deemed to be particularly important or “fundamental.”  A presump-
tion of unconstitutionality applies in such situations, where a liberty 
concern meets an equality concern, even if neither the interference nor 
the inequality standing alone would be enough to create such a pre-
sumption.  Although this doctrine, the fundamental interest branch of 
equal protection law, is relatively undertheorized and poorly unders-
tood, the Court has applied it in a variety of contexts. 
Most often, fundamental interest analysis is used to assess the con-
stitutionality of limitations on participation in certain government 
programs, where the programs themselves exist as a matter of gov-
ernment discretion and could be eliminated altogether without con-
stitutional impediment.  Take for instance the right to vote, which we 
discuss more fully below.  There is no federal due process right to vote 
in presidential or state elections, according to conventional under-
standing, but any voting apparatus that the government does establish 
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presumptively must be made equally available.165  Similarly, there is no 
fundamental due process right to a criminal appeal, but once the gov-
ernment establishes that institution, it must ensure (relatively) equal 
access to appellate review.166  In other words, even if a person’s interest 
in engaging in certain conduct does not enjoy protection under the 
liberty provision of the Due Process Clause, and even if the govern-
ment classification does not draw heightened scrutiny under standard 
equal protection analysis, nonetheless courts properly apply a pre-
sumption of unconstitutionality if the conduct is fundamentally im-
portant and if the government interferes with it unequally.  Civil mar-
riage, like voting and criminal appeals, is a discretionary government 
program that nevertheless carries enormous social and legal impor-
tance and that likewise sits at a nexus of equality and liberty concerns.  
Though real differences separate these interests, they are all properly 
protected by the fundamental interests doctrine. 
The fundamental interests branch of equal protection law is typi-
cally traced to Skinner v. Oklahoma.167  As we explained in Part I, the 
Skinner Court invalidated a law that provided for the sterilization of 
certain repeat offenders.  Under the sterilization law, qualifying of-
fenses included felonies such as larceny but did not include embez-
zlement.  So someone who repeatedly stole money from a stranger 
could be subject to sterilization, whereas someone who repeatedly 
embezzled the same amount from an employer could not.168  The 
Court recognized that normally a state could classify crimes as it 
wished, without special federal constitutional oversight.  Here, howev-
er, the proposed punishment involved “a basic liberty,” since 
“[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence 
and survival of the race.”169  Because the state law interfered with a 
fundamental interest unequally, strict scrutiny was required.170 
165 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (striking down 
a state poll tax under the Federal Equal Protection Clause). 
166 See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 606-07 (1974) (explaining that even 
though a state need not provide appellate review for criminal defendants at all, once it 
does, it must provide adequate access to the appellate system for indigent defendants).   
167 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
168 That was true even though a single conviction for larceny or embezzlement 
would trigger the same level of fines or imprisonment.  Id. at 542. 
169 Id. at 541. 
170 Today, after Griswold and Casey, there likely is a fundamental due process right 
to procreate that would be sufficient to justify the result in a case like Skinner.  In 1942, 
however, the Court had turned sharply away from the doctrine of substantive due 
process, particularly in the economic realm.  Justice Stone, concurring in Skinner, 
thought the case ought to be analyzed under due process, but only because the state 
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Zablocki applied this branch of equal protection law to civil mar-
riage, and it therefore provides a key precedent for our equal access 
approach.  Recall that in Zablocki, the Court invalidated a law that 
prohibited fathers who had court-ordered child support obligations 
from marrying unless they obtained a judicial determination that they 
were meeting those obligations and that their children would not be-
come “public charges.”171  Citing earlier pronouncements regarding 
the centrality of marriage, including Skinner, Loving, Meyer, and Gris-
wold, the Court reaffirmed that marriage constituted “the most impor-
tant relation in life.”172  But rather than deciding the case as a due 
process matter, the majority opinion left no doubt that it was groun-
ding its decision in the Equal Protection Clause.173  As in Skinner, the 
Court specified that heightened scrutiny applied because the law pro-
vided unequal access to marriage, a matter of fundamental impor-
tance, rather than because of the nature of the classification (of those 
who failed to pay child support):  “Since our past decisions make clear 
that the right to marry is of fundamental importance, and since the 
classification at issue here significantly interferes with the exercise of 
that right, we believe that ‘critical examination’ of the state interests 
advanced in support of the classification is required.”174 
Although we have argued that the link between marriage and pro-
creation has weakened,175 we concur that civil marriage is fundamen-
tally important and therefore that courts must carefully scrutinize laws 
or policies that selectively deny access to that institution.  That is not 
simply because of the social importance of equal access to marriage or 
the significance of that access for the equal dignity and status of indi-
viduals, but also because the Court has recognized a right of constitu-
tional importance.176 
law did not provide for a hearing to determine whether the prisoner’s criminal ten-
dencies could be inherited.  Justice Stone, a principal supporter of the New Deal, 
would not have suggested a return to the era of substantive due process.  See United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).     
171 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
172 Id. at 384-86 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888)).  
173 Id. at 382-83.  Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment but specifically disa-
greed with the Court’s reliance on the Equal Protection Clause, arguing that the deci-
sion should instead have relied on due process.  See id. at 391 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
174 Id. at 383 (majority opinion). 
175 See supra subsection I.D.1. 
176 Cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1972) (“[I]t is 
not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of 
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.  Thus, the key to discovering whether edu-
cation is ‘fundamental’ is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal signi-
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How is it possible, some might wonder, for the right to marry for 
same-sex couples to qualify as a fundamental interest under equal pro-
tection if it does not count as a fundamental right under substantive 
due process?  The Court has fueled confusion on this point by blend-
ing its analyses under the two clauses.177  Occasionally, the Court has 
even suggested—in passing and without analysis—that the standard 
for determining whether conduct is fundamental under the two con-
stitutional doctrines is the same.178  And, as noted above, in same-sex 
marriage litigation, courts have typically rejected plaintiffs’ fundamen-
tal interest equal protection claims simply by referring back to their 
due process analysis.179  We contend that this is a significant mistake. 
In other contexts, including the right to vote and the right to a crimi-
nal appeal, the Court has made clear that unequal allocation of a crit-
ical government program may trigger heightened scrutiny even if the 
underlying right is not protected by due process.  It is perfectly possi-
ble, in short, for an interest to be fundamental for equal access purpos-
es but not for due process purposes.  And thus, equal protection claims 
regarding access to civil marriage demand consideration on their own 
merits—they do not rise and fall with the due process analysis. 
This is not to say that all regulation of marriage requires heigh-
tened scrutiny.  Rather, Zablocki acknowledged that some regulation of 
marriage is permissible.  Although “[s]tatutory classification[s]” that 
interfere “directly and substantially with the right to marry” trigger 
ficance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing.  Nor is it to be found by 
weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel.  Rather, the answer 
lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed 
by the Constitution.”). 
 The Court has never specified precisely what standard should be used to make this 
assessment.  However, the Court’s prior statements in Zablocki are sufficient to support a 
holding that civil marriage is “fundamental.”  Additionally, civil marriage is a key aspect 
of how individuals construct a personal and familial identity, although it is no longer a 
prerequisite for lawful sexual intimacy or childbearing, as we have noted.  Moreover, it is 
rarely differentiated from religious and private marriages, which probably are protected 
liberty interests under the Due Process Clause.  Thus, unlike most other government 
programs, civil marriage is intimately intertwined with liberty interests that are protected 
by the Constitution, a point we return to in Sections III.B and III.C.  
177 See supra Section I.B; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 
(1997) (locating the relevant right in various provisions of the Constitution).  The confu-
sion is further compounded by cases, such as Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), in 
which the Court struck down statutes on equal protection grounds for unequally interfer-
ing with liberty interests protected under the Due Process Clause.  See supra note 101.  
178 See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (suggesting that the Glucksberg test 
should govern whether a right or interest is fundamental in both contexts). 
179 See supra note 80. 
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heightened scrutiny,180 “reasonable regulations that do not significant-
ly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may 
legitimately be imposed.”181  Fundamental interest analysis does not 
show any special concern over regulations that do not significantly 
impede access.  Of course, separating out restrictions that do and do 
not place a significant obstacle in the path of those seeking civil mar-
riage may require difficult line drawing in some instances. 
Zablocki’s effort to set limits on the presumption of unconstitutio-
nality reflects a common challenge, namely, how to carefully scrutin-
ize denial of access to certain fundamentally important government 
programs while at the same time permitting a level of regulation that is 
necessary to shape and operate such programs.  This differs from classi-
fication-based equal protection analysis, which simply posits that certain 
classifications will almost always be inappropriate.  And it differs from 
standard due process analysis, which typically protects rights that may 
be realized without any government involvement at all.182  Although 
both fundamental interest equal protection doctrine and due process 
doctrine share a concern with laws that impose a significant burden on 
protected conduct, only the former confronts that concern in the con-
text where the conduct itself is made possible by a government program 
that owes its existence and shape to official law and policy. 
For our purposes, the voting cases provide a particularly helpful 
analogue.  The Constitution is not commonly thought to guarantee a 
right to vote in presidential or state elections.183  Nevertheless, the 
Court has reasoned that because the right to vote is fundamentally 
important, state rules that interfere directly and equally with participa-
tion in elections are presumptively invalid as a violation of equal pro-
tection principles.  As the Court explained in Harper v. Virginia Board 
of Elections, the right to vote is “a fundamental matter in a free and 
democratic society,” and therefore “any alleged infringement . . . must 
180 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1978) (“When a statutory classifica-
tion significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be 
upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tai-
lored to effectuate only those interests.”). 
181 Id. at 386. 
182 See supra text accompanying notes 115-122.    
183 See supra note 16; see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“The individual 
citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the 
United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the 
means to implement its power to appoint members of the electoral college.”); Minor v. 
Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1875) (“[T]he Constitution of the United 
States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one.”). 
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be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”184  Thus, although poll tax-
es had been longstanding in many jurisdictions, the Court concluded 
that wealth had no relationship to voter qualifications and that poll 
taxes were impermissible.  Admittedly, Harper also suggested that 
heightened scrutiny might be merited because the poll tax classified 
on the basis of income,185 but even after the Court quashed the idea 
that wealth classifications raise any special constitutional concerns,186 it 
has continued to apply a presumption against regulations that provide 
unequal access to voting.187  Applying heightened scrutiny, the Court 
has struck down a wide range of voting requirements, such as proper-
ty-related regulations for special elections188 and durational residency 
requirements,189 restrictions that in many other contexts would not 
merit heightened scrutiny. 
At the same time, the government must have some discretion to 
regulate the voting process.  Recognizing this, the Court has devel-
oped a balancing test that attempts to distinguish between “severe re-
strictions” on the right to vote, which must be “narrowly drawn to ad-
vance a state interest of compelling importance,” and “reasonable, 
184 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kramer v. 
Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 629 (1969) (characterizing the right to 
vote as a matter of equal participation in state elections and noting that states have lati-
tude to decide whether to hold elections at all, at least for “certain public officials”); 
Cain, supra note 6, at 35 (recognizing that although the right to vote in state elections 
is not constitutionally protected, there is a right to participate on an equal basis with 
other qualified voters once the state has opted to hold elections). 
185 See Harper, 383 U.S. at 668 (“Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property 
. . . are traditionally disfavored.”).   
186 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973) (de-
clining to recognize wealth as a suspect class and noting that “this Court has never he-
retofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking 
strict scrutiny”). 
187 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (“[I]f a challenged statute 
grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to others, the Court 
must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state in-
terest.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05 (“When the 
state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote as 
the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its fundamental na-
ture lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each 
voter. . . . Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by 
later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another.” 
(citing Harper, 383 U.S. at 665)).  
188 See Kramer, 395 U.S. at 633 (invalidating a New York school board voting restric-
tion); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (striking down a provision 
limiting the ability to vote on a bond issue for utilities to property owners). 
189 See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 358 (overturning a minimum-residency-duration restric-
tion on voting). 
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nondiscriminatory restrictions,” which are generally permissible.190  
Additionally, even restrictions on the right to vote that are rational 
and would otherwise be constitutional may be impermissible if the 
state cannot show that they “protect the integrity and reliability of the 
electoral process itself.”191  Like the standard established by Zablocki, 
this approach may call for some difficult line drawing (and at times it 
may even risk arbitrariness).192  Nonetheless, the doctrine makes sense 
when one considers the competing interests at stake in this context.  
On the one hand, some regulations are necessary to set up and run 
the government program.  On the other hand, substantial limitations 
must receive careful evaluation because of the fundamental impor-
tance of the interest at issue. 
Cases concerning access to courts for indigent defendants are also 
analogous, and the Court has likewise drawn on a blend of due 
process and equal protection principles to resolve them.  Even though 
there is no federal constitutional right to an appeal in state criminal 
courts, constitutional difficulties can arise once appeals are provided 
“if indigents are singled out by the State and denied meaningful 
access to the appellate system.”193  Thus, for example, the state must 
provide a free trial transcript to an indigent defendant for a direct ap-
peal,194 and it must provide appellate counsel on a direct appeal as of 
right.195  That is true even though states obviously are not required to 
relieve every burden that results from poverty. 
This doctrine was originally developed in the criminal context.  
The Court has generally refused to extend the reasoning to civil court 
access—with one notable, and for our purposes very significant, set of 
exceptions:  certain legal processes concerning establishment and dis-
establishment of the family.  Drawing on the criminal law cases, the 
190 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (describ-
ing the distinction between constitutionally suspect restrictions and “reasonable, non-
discriminatory restrictions”).  
191 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1616 (2008) (plurali-
ty opinion); cf. id. at 1624, 1626-27 (Scalia, J., concurring) (reserving strict scrutiny for 
regulations that severely burden the right to vote, and possibly for those intended to 
disadvantage a class, and applying a less demanding balancing test to others).   
192 See generally Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Me-
chanics:  Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 329-30 (2007) (describ-
ing the Court’s task in regulating electoral processes). 
193 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611 (1974). 
194 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). 
195 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).  Counsel is not constitution-
ally required on discretionary appeals.  Ross, 417 U.S. at 614-16. 
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Court has protected indigent persons by holding that the state must 
waive filing fees for divorce cases,196 provide blood tests for paternity 
suits,197 provide transcripts for appeals from a termination of parental 
rights,198 and additionally, in some parental-termination matters, pro-
vide counsel.199  In all of these decisions, the Court has relied exten-
sively on the body of law, discussed in Section I.B, that describes the 
fundamental importance of marriage and family relations.200  Thus, 
the Court must “examine[] closely and contextually the importance of 
the governmental interest advanced” when evaluating “state controls” 
of these relationships.201  In other words, when the government, 
through its regulation of marriage, divorce, and parental status, serves 
as a gatekeeper to family formation and dissolution, the Court has 
made clear that access to legal process must be provided on a relative-
ly evenhanded basis.  This is true even though poverty is not recog-
nized as a suspect class.  That said, it may be significant that wealth-
based classifications have long been recognized as troubling, a point 
we discuss in greater detail below.202 
In discussing both the criminal appeal context and family-related 
civil cases in which assistance to the indigent may be required, the 
Court has acknowledged that neither the Due Process Clause nor the 
Equal Protection Clause “by itself provides an entirely satisfactory basis 
for the result reached.”203  Rather, cases of this kind “‘cannot be re-
solved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis’” since the li-
berty and equality principles are intertwined.204  Nonetheless, most 
“res[t] on an equal protection framework,” since “due process does 
not independently require . . . a right to appeal.”205  Liberty and equal-
ity are similarly intertwined in considerations of restrictions to mar-
riage—although due process may not guarantee a right to civil mar-
riage, equal protection principles mandate that the state allow 
evenhanded access to marriage once it has chosen to establish it. 
196 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971). 
197 Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981). 
198 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). 
199 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
200 See, e.g., M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116 (citing Turner, Zablocki, Loving, Skinner, Pierce, 
and Meyer). 
201 Id. at 116. 
202 See infra text accompanying notes 248-252. 
203 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974).  
204 M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120 (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666 (1983)). 
205 Id. at 120 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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B.  Liberty and Equality 
So far, we have argued that each of the dominant arguments for 
the right to marry for same-sex couples has significant limitations.206  
In the last Section, we showed how a right of equal access to civil mar-
riage could be protected instead under the fundamental interest 
branch of equal protection law, even if there were no freestanding 
due process or classification-based equal protection violation.  Here, 
and in the next Section, we go further and argue that our proposal is 
not only doctrinally available, but that it is conceptually preferable to 
the alternatives.  We think this is true in at least two respects.  First, it 
blends liberty and equality considerations in ways that match our con-
sidered convictions about why governments that provide a marriage 
licensing system must include same-sex couples.  Second, it produc-
tively combines traditionalism and progressivism:  on the one hand, it 
recognizes the central role that state-recognized marriage has tradi-
tionally played in our society and, on the other hand, it pushes the 
government to operate civil marriage evenhandedly in order to  
comply with the egalitarian aspirations of equal protection. 
1.  Liberty 
Equal access to civil marriage has a dual structure.  It has a liberty 
aspect insofar as aspiring spouses are claiming the freedom to partici-
pate in a government institution that carries immense personal, legal, 
and societal significance.  It also has an equality aspect, which we ad-
dress in the next subsection. 
As we explained in Part I, there are good reasons to think that the 
denial of access to civil marriage may not constitute an independent 
due process violation.  That might at first suggest that denials of access 
to civil marriage do not raise liberty concerns.  After all, such exclu-
sions do not interfere with personal autonomy, in the sense of the 
ability of private individuals to act without government involvement, 
because the conduct that couples are seeking to engage in is made 
possible by the government in the first place.  In this respect, a right 
to marry civilly is different from the right to private and religious mar-
riage and also from most other family-related due process rights.  Ad-
ditionally, we have described civil marriage as a government benefit 
program, and noted that different-sex marriage requirements deny 
same-sex couples those benefits.  Most denials of government subsi-
206 See supra Parts I-II.   
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dies do not raise liberty problems.  For example, we normally would 
not think that a student who is excluded from a modest state merit 
scholarship could complain of a government burden.207 
Nonetheless, our contention that there may not be a due process 
right to civil marriage should not be understood to mean that the 
right of access to civil marriage in general, and for same-sex couples in 
particular, does not implicate liberty concerns.  Civil marriage is a fun-
damentally important government program that has extraordinary per-
sonal and social significance in contemporary America.  This is all the 
more true because civil marriage is so rarely differentiated from private 
and religious marriages, which implicate more classic liberty interests.  
Thus, when the government denies access to civil marriage, it not only 
interferes with the ability of individuals to engage in conduct, but also 
with their ability to construct a personal and familial identity.208  In this 
sense, marriage is different from other important government pro-
grams, such as education or health care, that are less intimately  
intertwined with an individual’s identity.  Equal access therefore in-
volves a liberty interest not only in access to or participation in certain 
critical programs that the government chooses to offer, but it also pro-
tects the freedom to define self and family in socially recognized ways. 
One strength of recognizing the liberty aspect of marriage access 
is that it is universal in a way that the equality interests are not.  Once 
a state has chosen to implement civil marriage, liberty is curtailed for 
anyone, gay or straight, when the state refuses to permit that person to 
marry the person of her choice in a legal ceremony.209  The liberty in-
terest, as opposed to the equality interest, does not depend on diffe-
rential treatment.  It is shared generally by all citizens, not just by per-
sons who wish to marry someone of the same sex or who are otherwise 
selectively excluded from access to marriage.210 
207 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720-21 (2004) (reasoning inter alia that the bur-
den was not great when a student was denied a college tuition scholarship); cf. Tebbe, 
supra note 122, at 1267 (arguing that excluding religious exercise from such ordinary 
government subsidies raises free exercise concerns less often than is generally believed, 
because free exercise ought to be understood primarily as a liberty right, and denials 
of subsidies usually do not raise liberty concerns).   
208 Cf. Meyer, supra note 136, at 898 (arguing that denial of formal government 
recognition may constitute disruptive government intervention in private family rela-
tionships because it can in fact impair the dynamics of excluded relationships). 
209 While, of course, some people choose not to marry in a civil ceremony, they 
can still be said to have an interest in access to that government institution. 
210 Cf. Kenji Yoshino, The Pressure to Cover, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 15, 2006, at 32, 37 
(arguing for a liberty approach to civil rights, partly on grounds of universality). 
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Although this interest in government action resembles a positive 
right, there is a critical difference:  the government can choose not to 
offer a given program at all.211  That makes it distinct from social and 
economic rights, such as rights to education or housing that are pro-
tected in some constitutions and that do require the government to 
provide certain services. 
In sum, equal access captures our sense that liberty considerations 
are at play when courts consider exclusions from civil marriage, even 
though couples are not claiming a simple interest in freedom from 
government interference, and even though couples probably do not 
have a constitutional right to have the government set up a civil mar-
riage program in the first place.  Rather, once a government elects to 
establish a system of civil marriage, individuals then have important 
liberty interests in access to it. 
2.  Equality 
Equal access also has an equality aspect, which provides that the 
government presumptively must administer fundamentally important 
programs such as marriage in evenhanded ways.  Although many gen-
eral restrictions on civil marriage do not raise any equality concerns—
think for instance of a waiting period requirement, which applies in 
the same way to virtually everyone seeking a civil marriage—
regulations that are not evenhanded must be justified by the govern-
ment.  This concern is relational, not absolute, in that it investigates 
how the government is treating people relative to one another. 
The primary injury that the same-sex marriage litigation seeks to 
redress is that gay men and lesbians are denied the freedom to marry 
the partner of their choice on the basis of their sexual orientation.  In 
short, they are targets of discrimination.  It is indisputable that our 
country has long tolerated both public and private discrimination 
against gay men and lesbians—and that some (though certainly not 
all) opposition to expanding marriage rights rests on lingering ani-
mus.212  In other contexts, the Supreme Court has been clear that even 
if discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is not classified as 
inherently suspect, careful consideration is required when assessing 
211 See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2089-95 (distinguishing the right to participate in 
a civil marriage from a positive right). 
212 See generally, e.g., GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE?  THE HISTORY SHAPING 
TODAY’S DEBATE OVER GAY EQUALITY (2004) (recounting discrimination against gays 
and lesbians in the last century). 
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regulation that denies rights or selectively limits conduct on those 
grounds.213  The same is true here.  In short, equality is also at stake in 
these cases. 
3.  Synergy? 
Our equal access proposal simply acknowledges the twin consid-
erations of liberty and equality that are at play in many marriage ex-
clusions.  Although our analysis does not require going further, it 
might be possible also to identify a synergy between the two values.  A 
special harm could be said to result when states deny access to a fun-
damentally important government institution like civil marriage in a 
way that is not evenhanded, and particularly when access is denied to 
an identifiable social or status group.  As Pamela Karlan has phrased it 
when discussing such interplay in other contexts, looking “stereoscop-
ically—through the lenses of both the due process clause and the 
equal protection clause—can have synergistic effects, producing re-
sults that neither clause might reach by itself.”214 
This point is slightly different from the observation that a decision 
that rests formally on one ground nonetheless advances both interests.  
In Lawrence, the Court said that its substantive due process holding 
promoted the equal citizenship of gay men and lesbians.215  By con-
trast, the synergy argument would contend not simply that an equality-
based expansion of marriage rights to gay and lesbian couples would 
have the incidental effect of promoting liberty or autonomy, but in-
213 Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
214 Karlan, Stereoscopic, supra note 23, at 474; see also Karlan, Foreword, supra note 23, 
at 1463 (describing the Court’s “stereoscopic” approach to protecting rights of gay and 
lesbian people, “in which understandings of equality inform[] definitions of liberty,” 
and under which the Lawrence Court could strike down a selective ban on intimate 
conduct because “it had already implicitly recognized that gay people are entitled to 
equal respect for their choices about how to live their lives”). 
215 Cf. Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (2004) 
(“Lawrence . . . weaves together substantive due process and equal protection doctrine 
into a holistic analysis of the cultural weight of the individual rights involved.  Liberty 
and equality are the two chords of the opinion.”); Karlan, Foreword, supra note 23, at 
1449 (“Lawrence is a case about liberty that has important implications for the jurispru-
dence of equality.”); Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 86, at 459-60 (showing how Lawrence 
bridged liberty and equality doctrines).  Lawrence is not the only case to simultaneously 
advance both interests.  Kenneth Karst has persuasively demonstrated that many of the 
Court’s substantive due process decisions have concerned selective denial of freedoms 
to discrete groups and that “concerns about group subordination have profoundly in-
fluenced the doctrinal growth of substantive due process.”  Kenneth L. Karst, The Liber-
ties of Equal Citizens:  Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 102 (2007). 
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stead that the intersection of the two concerns captures a harm that 
might not be actionable on either ground independently. 
As described in Parts I and II, most courts considering challenges 
to different-sex marriage rules have considered the due process claims 
wholly apart from the (classification-based) equal protection claims.  
This hermetic approach may fail to appreciate the dual character of 
the injury done by denying marriage rights to same-sex couples, even 
if synergistic effects are put to one side.  Indeed, as the Massachusetts 
high court observed in granting marriage rights to same-sex couples, 
“In matters implicating marriage, family life, and the upbringing of 
children, the two constitutional concepts [of equal protection and 
due process] frequently overlap.”216  In the fundamental interest 
branch of equal protection law, the Court has been refreshingly forth-
right in acknowledging that liberty and equality are both at play.217 
C.  Traditionalism and Progressivism 
One of the fights surrounding access to civil marriage for same-sex 
couples concerns whether the right is rooted in tradition.  That mat-
ters because of judicial pronouncements describing “fundamental 
rights” under due process analysis as those interests that are “‘deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’”218 or those that are “‘so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people’ that they are 
considered ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’”219 or those 
that are grounded in the “‘traditions and collective conscience of our 
people.’”220  All of these formulations look backward to tradition in 
order to determine whether an interest counts as fundamental under 
the Due Process Clause.  The question then becomes whether the 
right to marry in a civil ceremony ought to be defined at a high level 
of generality, according to which the longstanding interest would be 
understood as freedom to marry the partner of one’s choice, or 
whether it should be taken at a lower level, so that only official unions 
between one man and one woman would be protected.  As discussed 
216 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 953 (Mass. 2003). 
217 See supra text accompanying note 203-204.   
218 Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 616 (Md. 2007) (quoting Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).  
219 Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)). 
220 See id. at 617 (articulating the Maryland high court’s preferred standard and 
quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).  
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above, courts have almost uniformly taken the latter tack and rejected 
same-sex couples’ due process claims.221 
A virtue of our equal access approach is that it offers judges a way 
to sidestep the arbitrariness that characterizes this debate about the 
level of generality used to identify traditions.  It may be hard to make 
a principled argument for thinking of marriage in one way rather 
than the other.222  But, for the purposes of equal access analysis, all 
221 See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.  The Supreme Court, like lower 
courts, has struggled to determine the level of generality that should be used to assess 
substantive due process claims.  One of the most prominent examples is Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., a case considering the constitutionality of a state law providing that a child 
born to a married woman living with her husband was, in most cases, conclusively pre-
sumed to be the issue of the couple.  491 U.S. 110 (1989).  The law was challenged by a 
biological father whose claim for visitation rights with his daughter had been denied 
on the ground that he was not her legal father—and could not pursue a claim to be-
come her legal father—because the child’s mother had been married to another man 
at the time when she was born.  Id. at 113-15.  In a notable, almost notorious, footnote, 
Justice Scalia argued that judges should “refer to the most specific level at which a rele-
vant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identi-
fied.”  Id. at 127 n.6.  Justice Scalia reasoned that the most specific available tradition in 
this case limited the rights of “adulterous natural” fathers in such situations.  Id.  He 
argued that if judges were permitted latitude to define the tradition in question more 
broadly—for example, in this case, protecting the interests of parents—they would be 
able to impose their own views on society, because traditions viewed at a more general 
level provide little guidance or constraint.  Id.  
 Yet the footnote only drew the vote of one other Justice.  Justices O’Connor and 
Kennedy specifically declined to join the footnote, even though they endorsed the rest 
of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion.  Id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring, joined by 
Kennedy, J.).  They declined to join the footnote on the ground that several of the 
Court’s decisions may not have defined the relevant right in the most specific way poss-
ible, and they cited as examples the marriage cases Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967), and Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), among other precedents.  Id.  Justice 
Brennan, writing on behalf of four Justices, dissented and argued that a rigid conception 
of tradition would wrongly limit the ability of due process to check state law crafted by a 
majority.  Rather, the liberty protected by due process “must include the freedom not to 
conform” to the majority’s conception of the good life or the family, and Justice Scalia’s 
approach “squashes this freedom by requiring specific approval from history before pro-
tecting anything in the name of liberty.”  Id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 Moreover, Justice Scalia’s footnote relied heavily upon the Court’s analysis in Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986), which the Court subsequently overruled in 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003), in large part on the ground that it classi-
fied the right at issue too narrowly.   
 For criticism of Justice Scalia’s footnote, see, for example, LAURENCE H. TRIBE & 
MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 97-117 (1991); J.M. Balkin, Tradi-
tion, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1614-29 
(1990); Edward Gary Spitko, Note, A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia’s Approach to Fun-
damental Rights Adjudication, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1337, 1339. 
222 See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2085 (arguing that defining marriage narrowly 
suffers from the defect that it “seems to draw arbitrary lines”); id. (suggesting that de-
fining the right to marry narrowly may be arbitrary “in principle”).  On the difference 
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that needs to be shown initially is an interest in state-sponsored mar-
riage that is of fundamental importance.  The Supreme Court has 
never made clear precisely what standard should be used to determine 
which interests are protected as fundamental for equal protection pur-
poses.  Even if that assessment is made with reference to tradition, how-
ever, it is easy to establish a backward-looking claim that marriage meets 
this standard, at least with respect to unions between one woman and 
one man.  In fact, the Court has already held as much in Zablocki.  Equal 
access then departs from backward-looking analysis and asks separately 
whether excluding gay and lesbian couples from civil marriage can be 
justified.  At that second stage, we believe the analysis should no longer 
look to tradition, but instead should invoke the forward-looking aspects 
of equal protection doctrine.  This approach sidelines the fact that, his-
torically, same-sex couples have not been permitted to marry.   
Other fundamental interest decisions have joined backward-
looking and forward-looking tendencies in similar ways.223  In the elec-
tion context, the Court held that the right to vote included protection 
against poll taxes without regard to whether charging voters was a 
common practice at that point in history.224  It was voting as such that 
was deemed to be rooted in American political traditions, not voting 
free of financial burden.  In fact, the Court candidly acknowledged that 
protecting indigent voters was a step forward, justified because 
“[n]otions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the 
Equal Protection Clause do change.”225  Likewise, criminal defendants 
were given free access to appellate courts not because court fees had 
between defining fundamental rights in due process doctrine and fundamental inter-
ests in equal protection, see supra text accompanying notes 177-179.    
223 We believe that voting and court access offer the strongest analogies to civil 
marriage access, and accordingly, our analysis focuses on these fundamental interest 
cases.  The “right to travel” doctrine is also sometimes located within the fundamental 
interest branch of equal protection law.  See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 
(1969) (“Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate 
movement, its constitutionality must be judged by a stricter standard . . . .”).  In that 
context as well, the Court protected the right of welfare recipients to move from state 
to state, not because that specific interest was grounded in tradition, but because the 
more generalized right to travel was.  See id. at 642.  More recently, the Court has sug-
gested that the right to travel is better located in the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-03 (1999).  
224 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (“[T]he Equal Protection 
Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era.”); see also id. at 668-69 
(observing that “[l]evy ‘by the poll[]’ . . . is an old familiar form of taxation” but insisting 
nevertheless that “[i]n determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we 
have never been confined to historic notions of equality” (citations omitted)). 
225 Id. at 669. 
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traditionally been waived for indigent defendants—they had not been—
but rather because the Court ruled that government could no longer 
deny meaningful appellate review to indigent criminal defendants.226  
Even when government regulations have been upheld in these areas, it 
has not been because the regulations themselves were historically 
rooted, but instead because they either did not significantly interfere 
with fundamental interests or because they did so in justifiable ways.227 
Another way of thinking about the interaction is to allow the time-
honored institution of civil marriage to be identified in a very specific 
way—say, as limited to one woman and one man—but then to say that 
the equal protection component of our approach requires courts to 
interrogate the way that lines have traditionally been drawn around 
that institution.  After all, the Equal Protection Clause is designed to 
police exactly the sort of arbitrariness that is involved when civil mar-
riage is defined with great specificity.228  To the degree that Lawrence 
requires this sort of interrogation of historical exclusions, it can be 
thought of as likewise fusing equal protection and due process im-
pulses.229  A similar combination arguably was implicit in Loving as 
well, which decried the limiting of access to marriage—a “fundamen-
tal freedom”—on so “unsupportable a basis as . . . racial classifica-
tion.”230  In this second way of thinking about our proposal, equal 
access is capable of challenging even an attempt to define marriage 
with a great deal of specificity.  Regardless of whether the fundamen-
tal interest in civil marriage is initially defined with greater or lesser 
226 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (“It is true that a State is not required 
by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at 
all.  But that is not to say that a State that does grant appellate review can do so in a 
way that discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty.” 
(citation omitted)). 
227 See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1623 (2008) 
(holding that any burden that the state’s identification requirement placed on voters 
was justified by governmental interests, such as avoiding voter fraud). 
228 See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2111-12 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause is a self-
conscious repudiation of traditions that embody illicit line-drawing, making distinc-
tions that are arbitrary or invidious.  The Equal Protection Clause stands for a com-
mitment to public reason-giving that puts traditions to the test. . . . [T]he Due Process 
Clause has had a quite different function.  The purpose of that clause has generally 
been to protect time-honored practices from governmental intrusion.”). 
229 See id. (arguing that the Lawrence Court defined the due process right accord-
ing to emerging values, thereby generalizing tradition, and that by doing so the Court 
folded in “a kind of equal protection component” capable of questioning the way lines 
had been drawn around traditional institutions). 
230 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see also supra text accompanying notes 
53-59. 
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specificity, the equality value requires exclusions from that institution 
to be justified.  Either way, in other words, our conclusion here is that 
equal access combines the backward-looking orientation of due 
process with the forward-looking impulse of equal protection. 
In sum, our approach not only combines liberty and equality 
principles, as shown in the last Section, but it also combines consider-
ations of traditionalism and progressivism.  It is oriented toward tradi-
tion in its recognition of marriage’s importance to individuals and to 
society, but it is also progressive in its insistence that marriage pre-
sumptively should be extended to same-sex couples on equal terms.  
In this way, the force of marriage’s historical importance dovetails 
with strong constitutional pressure toward evenhandedness in the 
administration of that institution.  This twofold analysis avoids difficult 
debates over whether advocates or opponents have identified tradition 
on the right level of generality.  Most will agree that the institution of 
civil marriage is fundamentally important to American public and pri-
vate life.  The question is whether a state is constitutionally obligated 
to administer that institution in evenhanded ways. 
This analysis helps identify a related, but distinct, benefit of the 
equal access approach.  Much opposition to extending marriage rights 
to same-sex couples stems from individuals’ sincere religious beliefs.  
But it is a hallmark of our constitutional jurisprudence that the state 
may not advance or inhibit any particular religious view.  Equal access 
helps sharpen the distinction between private marriages, which are 
protected as a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause, and 
civil marriage, protected as a fundamental interest under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Although we contend that the state presumptively 
must provide access to civil marriage on an evenhanded basis, reli-
gious denominations and other private groups remain free to make 
their own determinations regarding whether they will recognize such 
unions.231  Individuals who oppose permitting same-sex couples to 
231 See supra text accompanying notes 129-131130.  The Supreme Court of Iowa 
makes this distinction explicit in its decision requiring the state to begin offering same-
sex couples the right to marry civilly on the grounds that the differential treatment of 
gays and lesbians lacked adequate justification.  See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 
904-06 (Iowa 2009) (“In the final analysis, we give respect to the views of all Iowans on 
the issue of same-sex marriage—religious or otherwise—by giving respect to our con-
stitutional principles [of equal protection for all].  These principles require that the 
state recognize both opposite-sex and same-sex civil marriage.  Religious doctrine and 
views contrary to this principle of law are unaffected, and people can continue to asso-
ciate with the religion that best reflects their views.”).  Perhaps not coincidentally, the 
Iowa decision is the only unanimous state high court decision on the issue in recent 
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marry may feel less threatened by the expansion of civil marriage if 
the constitutional basis for that change evokes the broader and famili-
ar commitment to ensuring equal access to government institutions 
and more clearly protects their own individual—and their own indi-
vidual religion’s—right to make a different determination with re-
spect to private marriages. 
D.  Limits 
Of course there are limits to the right we are proposing.  In par-
ticular, a successful equal access claim must involve a substantial bur-
den on access to a fundamentally important government institution, 
such as civil marriage.  Moreover, courts will require plaintiffs to show 
that the government has administered its program unequally, and 
they may be particularly willing to find an equal access violation where 
the marriage regulation at issue excludes an identifiable social or fam-
ily group.  Finally, even if a substantial burden exists, the law will still 
be upheld if the government can show that it is narrowly tailored to a 
sufficiently important interest.   
1.  Substantial Burden 
First, to qualify for protection under the equal access theory, the 
challenged government limitation must place a substantial or signifi-
cant burden on the right to enter civil marriage.  Regulations that do 
not interfere significantly with marriage are not presumptively un-
constitutional on equal access grounds.232  This proposed limitation 
draws on language in Zablocki that distinguishes between regulations 
that interfere “directly and substantially with the right to marry,” and 
“reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with deci-
sions to enter into the marital relationship.”233  A similar threshold re-
years; other recent decisions, both those finding a constitutional violation and those 
denying the claim, have been issued by sharply divided courts.  
232 A hypothetical law that discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation without 
imposing a substantial obstacle to civil marriage might well be unconstitutional on 
other grounds, but not under our equal access theory.  In other words, this Article 
leaves to one side laws that discriminate against gay and lesbian couples without bur-
dening the right to marry. 
233 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978); see also Cain, supra note 6, at 
35 n.44 (“[A]s the fundamental rights prong of equal protection analysis has been de-
veloped, the unequal allocation will be strictly scrutinized only if there is a ‘direct and 
substantial’ burden on the right.” (citing Montgomery v. Carr, 101 F.3d 1117, 1120-21 
(6th Cir. 1996) (holding that anti-nepotism rules do not place a direct and substantial 
burden on marriage))). 
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quirement is used in the voting rights context.234  This limit references 
the liberty component of our equal access approach.  Though applying 
it may at times require difficult line drawing,235 we think it appropriately 
protects fundamental interests while leaving room for regulations that 
are not unduly onerous.  That said, courts must apply such tests with 
care to ensure that they rigorously assess significant burdens.236 
Both before and after Zablocki, courts have made such distinctions 
when assessing the extent to which regulations burden marriage or 
family relationships.  For example, in Califano v. Jobst, the Supreme 
Court upheld a provision of the Social Security Act that revoked cer-
tain disability benefits from recipients when they married people who 
did not themselves qualify for those benefits.237  According to the 
Court, that restriction was permissible on the assumption that mar-
riage often means an increase in economic status.  Although the fund-
ing condition did, in a sense, interfere with the right to marry, it did 
not do so in a way that required heightened scrutiny.238  The majority 
in Zablocki subsequently distinguished Jobst on the ground that the law 
in Zablocki (prohibiting individuals who owed child support from mar-
rying) involved greater “directness and substantiality of the interfe-
rence with the freedom to marry.”239  Likewise, courts have turned away 
234 See supra text accompanying note 190 (explaining that “reasonable, nondiscri-
minatory restrictions” on the right to vote may be permissible under Burdick v. Takushi, 
504 U.S. 428 (1992), and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983)). 
235 This has been the subject of considerable discussion in the voting rights con-
text.  See, for example, the exchange in Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S.Ct. 
1610 (2008), between the plurality, id. at 1616 n.8, and Justice Scalia’s concurrence, id. 
at 1624-25 (Scalia, J. concurring). 
236 Although Crawford ostensibly requires a relatively robust inquiry into whether 
regulations are related to voter qualifications, the support for the voter identification 
requirements it upheld was arguably quite weak, and powerful arguments can be made 
that the identification qualifications actually imposed a rather significant burden.  See 
id. at 1627-43 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1643-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Thus, it is 
important to note a danger implicit in our approach:  it requires courts to make judg-
ment calls regarding whether a burden on marriage is substantial and whether it is 
even handed, as we discuss next.  Our hope is that judges would apply such standards 
responsibly.  As we note in the next Section, courts have uniformly held that the gov-
ernment interests put forward to justify denying denial of marriage rights to same-sex 
couples are insufficient to pass any kind of heightened scrutiny.   
237 434 U.S. 47, 58 (1977). 
238 Id. at 53-54 (applying rational basis review). 
239 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 n.12 (1978) (adding that the social secu-
rity condition in Jobst, unlike the regulation in Zablocki, “placed no direct legal obstacle 
in the path of persons desiring to get married”). 
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challenges to the “marriage penalty” imposed by income tax codes.240  
We also believe that reasonable waiting periods and the procedural 
formalities associated with marriage licenses would be routinely consi-
dered permissible.  Minimum-age requirements, too, could be seen rel-
atively insubstantial in the sense that they do not bar individuals from 
marriage under such regulations—they only require individuals to wait 
until both aspiring spouses are old enough to marry under state law.241 
2.  Inequality 
Second, equal access only applies a presumption of invalidity 
where plaintiffs can show that the government has administered its 
program unequally.  A decision by a state to eliminate civil marriage en-
tirely would not state an equal access claim because it would treat eve-
ryone uniformly.  (As we discussed earlier, however, such a reform is 
probably not viable politically.)  Many standard marriage requirements 
would likewise be permissible simply because they apply in the “same 
way” to everyone, as a matter of current social practices and arrange-
ments.242  And the state may prohibit everyone from marrying objects or 
concepts, so long as it can show a rational basis for the regulation.243    
Laws that treat individuals unequally, by contrast, would require 
stronger justifications.  The challenge here is that virtually any law can 
240 See, e.g., Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (upholding the 
marriage penalty in tax codes).  
241 See, e.g., Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that mini-
mum-age restrictions delay, but do not deny, exercise of the right to marry).  Even if 
courts deemed age requirements significant enough burdens to trigger a presumption 
of unconstitutionality, it is possible that the state’s legitimate interest in ensuring suffi-
cient mental capacity to commit to the responsibilities of marriage would be sufficient 
to justify these requirements, particularly since they accord with numerous other areas 
of law in which minors are treated differently from adults.  See infra subsection III.D.3 
(discussing our third limit).   
242 Karlan suggests that laws prohibiting bestiality, for instance, are less problemat-
ic because “that behavior is not tied as an empirical matter in contemporary America 
to membership in a recognized social group” and that “[b]y contrast, gay people in the 
United States do form a social group whose membership extends beyond their engag-
ing in specific sexual acts.”  Karlan, Foreword, supra note 23, at 1458.  In other words, 
“statutes that target same-sex behavior are directed at a class whose primary characte-
ristic is not its engagement in discrete acts but its existence as a subordinate social 
group.”  Id.  Karlan is speaking about the criminalization of sexual conduct here, but a 
similar distinction might be drawn between laws that disallow civil marriage between 
humans and animals, on the one hand, and same-sex marriage bans, on the other.  
243 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2083 (noting that states may prohibit people from 
entering into civil marriages with “their dog, their house, their refrigerator, July 21, or 
a rose petal”). 
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be reframed as treating some individual citizen “unequally.”  For ex-
ample, a waiting period nominally treats those who are in a hurry to 
wed differently from those who are not, and yet it would not present 
an equal access problem.  Usually, distinguishing between marriage 
regulations that involve inequality and those that are evenhanded will 
be a matter of common sense.  Yet in applying this limit in difficult 
cases, courts may choose to consider whether a challenged regulation 
singles out an identifiable social or status group as one factor in their 
analysis. In other words, inequality may become particularly proble-
matic where the law excludes a recognized group.244  Nothing in our 
analysis depends on consideration of the nature of the group affected, 
but including it may strengthen the appeal of the approach to certain 
courts and in certain cases, potentially including challenges to different-
sex marriage requirements. 
244 Of course, this raises the question of what constitutes a group, exclusion of 
which would be sufficient to raise special evenhandedness concerns under our equal 
access approach.  We do not think that a traditional suspect class is required; if it were, 
then the fundamental interest analysis would add nothing to the standard equal pro-
tection claim.  At the same time, it is important to recognize that an exclusion that af-
fects an actually existing social group defined primarily by activities other than getting 
married itself may require a stronger government rationale than a prohibition that on-
ly applies to people who wish to marry, say, their cars. 
 We suggest there are at least three ways to define a group for these purposes, any 
of which would help gay and lesbian couples seeking access to civil marriage.  First, a 
group might be identified by evidence of historical or contemporary animus or dis-
crimination against them.  In this sense, equal access analysis would respond to the 
classic concern that legislative or popular majorities may offer inadequate protection 
to disadvantaged or disfavored minorities.  We know from other cases concerning gay 
rights, such as Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003), that the Court has acknowledged that differential treatment of gay men and 
lesbians may be reason for special concern, even though the Court has stopped short 
of declaring sexual orientation to be constitutionally suspect for all purposes.  Second, 
a group might be identified for our purposes by reference to a longstanding or wide-
spread social movement.  Without a doubt, grassroots campaigns have furthered the 
fight for gay rights, and their impact has been felt in legislatures as well as in courts 
and in the wider culture.  The same cannot be said for people who wish to marry, for 
example, their cars.  Finally, social status may play an important role in identifying the 
sort of group that must presumptively be given equal access to fundamentally impor-
tant government programs.  Status groups can be organized around common lifestyles 
or cultural attributes, but regardless of how they are organized, their members share a 
particular level of social respect or esteem.  See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 
106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2322-23 (1997) (defining a status group).  
 Much more could be said here.  Our point is simply that however the term 
“group” is defined, gay men and lesbians qualify.  Courts could properly consider this 
as an important factor in assessing whether the government can provide adequate jus-
tification for selectively denying same-sex couples access to civil marriage.    
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Interesting in this respect is that many of the classic cases invoking 
the fundamental interest branch of equal protection law concerned 
the poor.  Examples include Harper, the poll tax case,245 various court-
access cases,246 and Zablocki itself, which addressed the marriage rights 
of noncustodial parents who had fallen behind on child support pay-
ments or could not prove that their children would not become pub-
lic charges.247  In those cases, the Court expressed unease because the 
challenged statutes selectively denied poor persons equal access to the 
important government institutions of voting, courts, and marriage.248  
In early cases, the Court struggled with whether to recognize wealth as 
a suspect classification for all purposes.249  But even after the Court’s 
decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, which 
declined to recognize wealth as a suspect class,250 the Court has con-
tinued to show special concern with denial of fundamental interests to 
the poor.  For example, in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., the Court analogized to its 
earlier voting and court access cases and concluded that termination 
of parental rights was another category “in which the State may not 
‘bolt the door to equal justice’” and thus that counsel for indigents 
was required.251  It distinguished cases concerning other civil matters, 
such as bankruptcy, on the ground that they did not involve funda-
mental interests.252 
The dual nature of equal access claims is important here.253  The 
troubling aspect of denial of marriage rights to gays and lesbians, like 
245 Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
246 See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding that an indigent litigant 
had a right to a transcript for appeal from termination of parental rights); Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that individuals had a right to counsel on di-
rect criminal appeal).  See generally supra text accompanying notes 193-201. 
247 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375 (1978). 
248 See Karlan, Foreword, supra note 23, at 1457 (noting that “the fact that the law 
explicitly targets behavior and not persons does not mean that it is not also class legis-
lation” and analogizing to late nineteenth-century voter-eligibility statutes that ex-
cluded blacks from elections). 
249 See, e.g., Harper, 363 U.S. at 668 (“Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or proper-
ty, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored.” (citation omitted)). 
250 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (concluding that the Texas school-funding system, which 
provided less support to children living in districts with lower property values, did not 
“operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class”). 
251 519 U.S. at 124 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring)). 
252 Id. at 114-15. 
253 As noted above, the majority in M.L.B. explicitly acknowledges that in this line 
of cases, “[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge.”  Id. at 120 (quoting 
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983)).  Indeed, the dissent takes issue with 
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denial of voting or court access to poor persons, is that an important 
liberty interest is denied (even if it does not amount to a freestanding 
due process violation) on a basis that raises significant equal protec-
tion concerns (even if it does not qualify as a suspect class for all pur-
poses).254  Thus, a principled distinction may be made between our 
position and a more general claim that any reference to sexual orien-
tation would be subject to heightened scrutiny, just as the Court’s 
holdings in the poll tax and court access cases have not led to heigh-
tened scrutiny of all laws that disadvantage the poor.  Likewise, be-
cause of the state action involved in civil marriage, our position is dis-
tinguishable from the claim that the state has an affirmative obligation 
to support other fundamental liberty interests, such as the right to 
terminate a pregnancy, that may be exercised without government in-
volvement.255  In both these ways (and whatever the normative merits 
of these distinctions), the line we propose to draw fits with the analysis 
in other fundamental interest cases.256 
this, contending that if “neither [the Due Process nor the Equal Protection] Clause 
affords petitioner the right to a free, civil-appeal transcript, [one must] assume that no 
amalgam of the two does.”  Id. at 130 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
254 The Court was arguably motivated by similar concerns when it held that public 
education could not be denied to undocumented immigrants, even though education 
is not a fundamental right and the state generally has considerable discretion in how it 
regulates immigration.  See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (“[M]ore is involved 
in these cases than the abstract question whether [the statute] discriminates against a 
suspect class, or whether education is a fundamental right. . . . By denying these child-
ren a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the structure of our civic 
institutions . . . .”). 
255 Cf. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 125 (distinguishing the Court’s holding that a state must 
provide funding to indigent people appealing a decision that terminates parental 
rights from cases in which the Court held that the government need not provide funds 
for the exercise of fundamental rights “in economic circumstances that existed apart 
from state action”).  Excluding religious exercise from government support therefore 
also raises different questions.  Cf. Tebbe, supra note 122 (arguing against a free exer-
cise right to equal government support of religious exercise). 
256 Moreover, the key is not whether the legislation at issue discriminates facially 
but whether, under a common-sense understanding of its application, it selectively de-
nies a recognized group access to fundamentally important institutions.  Poll taxes and 
court-access fees, for example, did not explicitly exclude individuals on the basis of 
their wealth.  Nonetheless, the Court quite comfortably concluded that their delete-
rious effects were borne by the poor.  This distinction matters.  Supporters of different-
sex marriage requirements sometimes argue that they impose limitations that apply 
evenhandedly to everyone, in that both straight and gay persons may marry persons of 
the opposite sex.  As discussed above, that argument is effectively foreclosed by Loving, 
in which the Court rejected Virginia’s argument that its anti-miscegenation law prohi-
bited everyone from marrying outside their own race, not just African Americans.  Lov-
ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (“[W]e reject the notion that mere ‘equal applica-
tion’ of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications 
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Thus, courts applying our equal access approach should recognize 
that laws excluding gay and lesbian couples from civil marriage do se-
lectively deny access on the basis of group status. 
3.  Interest Balancing 
Even a law that substantially interferes with the choice to marry for 
a particular group only sets up a presumption of invalidity that can be 
rebutted by a sufficiently strong government justification.  Here it may 
be useful to consider some of the wider applications of equal access, 
outside the context of same-sex couples.  For instance, even if laws 
that prohibit polygamy trigger heightened scrutiny, they could argua-
bly be justified by a showing that polygamy very often harms women in 
ways that would be difficult to detect and address without a complete 
ban on the practice.257  In other words, even assuming that polygamists 
have suffered substantial interference with a fundamental interest in 
access to civil marriage, nevertheless bans on plural marriage may be 
justifiable in some situations as prophylactic measures designed to ad-
dress well-founded fears of harm to women that might otherwise go 
undetected.  Incest prohibitions, similarly, could conceivably be justi-
fied by concern over the risk of genetic disorders in the children of 
such couples.258  Determining the constitutionality of such prohibitions 
is beyond the scope of this Article, but considering such bans helps to 
make our point here, which is simply that access to civil marriage could 
be limited by regulations that are closely tailored to sufficiently impor-
from the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of all invidious racial discriminations 
. . . .”).  Unsurprisingly, when faced with standard classification-based equal protection 
claims, both federal and state courts have consistently recognized the reality that dif-
ferent-sex marriage requirements do differentiate on the basis of sexual orientation in 
that gays and lesbians, as opposed to heterosexuals, may not marry the partner of their 
choice.  See supra note 145 and accompanying text.  This is true even though courts 
have split on the secondary question of whether such distinctions are inherently sus-
pect.  See supra notes 146-148 and notes 154-158 and accompanying text.  
257 However, it is important to note that some polygamous relationships eschew 
hierarchy and are truly consensual.  Accordingly, serious inquiry might be merited re-
garding the constitutionality of upholding an absolute ban.  See generally Elizabeth F. 
Emens, Monogamy’s Law:  Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004). 
258 Note, however, that some incest laws prohibit marriages or sexual relations be-
tween individuals, such as step-siblings or persons related through adoption, that do not 
pose such genetic risks.  See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-302 (1997).  Permitting such 
relationships may implicate other concerns regarding whether the relationship is truly 
consensual, but again, further consideration would be merited.  Cf. Israel v. Allen, 577 
P.2d 762 (Colo. 1978) (finding unconstitutional an incest law prohibiting marriage be-
tween adoptive siblings because it was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest).  
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tant government interests.  We now turn to showing why laws that ex-
clude gay and lesbian couples from civil marriage cannot survive our 
form of interest balancing or any form of heightened review. 
E.  Application of the Equal Access Approach 
We have shown why the right to marry should be characterized as 
a fundamental interest under the Equal Protection Clause, and we 
have suggested that exclusion from civil marriage constitutes a sub-
stantial burden on that interest.  Under our proposal, different-sex 
marriage requirements would trigger a presumption of unconstitutio-
nality.  In this Section, we show why we believe that the justifications 
typically offered in defense of such laws are inadequate to overcome 
this presumption.  We also think it would be unconstitutional for 
states to establish a separate civil union or domestic partner status for 
same-sex couples while reserving the moniker marriage for different-
sex couples.  We address each issue in turn. 
1.  Complete Denial of Marriage Rights 
In states where neither marriage nor an equivalent status such as 
civil union is available to same-sex couples, the analysis is relatively 
straightforward.  First, members of gay and lesbian couples experience 
a substantial burden because they cannot marry their chosen partners.  
Moreover, as discussed above, they constitute an identifiable social 
group.  Even if the laws at issue do not explicitly classify on the basis of 
sexual orientation, they deny same-sex couples access to civil mar-
riage.  This raises a presumption of unconstitutionality. 
Analysis then turns to the adequacy of the justifications put for-
ward for different-sex marriage laws.  It is significant that no state 
court that has applied any sort of heightened scrutiny—either strict or 
intermediate—has found any of the proffered justifications sufficient.  
In other words, a presumption of illegality is unlikely to be rebutted. 
In recent state-level litigation, two rationales have been found suf-
ficient under rational basis review.  Both relate marriage to children.  
First, the so-called “responsible procreation” argument posits that 
states have an interest in promoting stable families for children, and 
that, consequently, states may choose to limit the benefits of marriage 
to different-sex couples because only different-sex couples can have 
children accidentally.  Under this thinking, same-sex couples, who typ-
ically have children through laborious and necessarily preplanned 
processes like artificial insemination or adoption, do not need the 
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same incentives to form stable family structures.  This rationale was 
found adequate to justify different-sex marriage requirements in Ari-
zona, Indiana, Maryland, New York, and Washington.259  Variations on 
this argument include the simple claim that marriage is uniquely and 
crucially the legal site for procreation, and, since same-sex couples 
cannot have procreative sexual intercourse, they by definition cannot 
marry,260 or that the state may encourage heterosexual unions as “op-
timal” for procreation.261 
The other justification for different-sex marriage requirements 
that has succeeded in recent cases—again, under rational basis re-
view—concerns child rearing.  In particular, it holds that heterosexual 
marriage provides the “optimal” environment for raising children.  As 
New York’s highest court put it, “the Legislature could rationally pro-
ceed on the common-sense premise that children will do best with a 
mother and father in the home.”262  Washington’s high court also re-
lied upon this justification.263  The argument sometimes is explicitly 
framed in terms of encouraging child rearing by biological parents.264 
Notably, even in states that have upheld different-sex marriage re-
quirements, many courts have gone out of their way to distance them-
selves from the government’s rationales by emphasizing that rational 
basis review is exceptionally deferential.265  This level of deference is 
259 Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 462-63 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24-26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); 
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 633-34 (Md. 2007); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 
1, 7-8 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 983 (Wash. 2006). 
260 See Stein, supra note 112 (manuscript at 102-14) (discussing early cases that re-
lied upon this argument). 
261 Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 880 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“The 
Court finds it is a legitimate interest to encourage the stability and legitimacy of what 
may reasonably be viewed as the optimal union for procreating . . . .”). 
262 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 8. 
263 See Andersen, 138 P.3d at 983 (“[G]iven the rational relationship standard and 
that the legislature was provided with testimony that children thrive in opposite-sex 
marriage environments, the legislature acted within its power to limit the status of 
marriage.”); see also id. at 1005 ( Johnson, J., concurring) (“The legislature was offered 
evidence that children tend to thrive best in families consisting of mothers, fathers, 
and their biological children.”).  
264 See, e.g., Smelt, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 880 (“DOMA is rationally related to the legi-
timate government interest . . . of encouraging the creation of stable relationships that 
facilitate rearing children by both biological parents.”). 
265 See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 629 (Md. 2007) (“Under [the ration-
al basis review] standard, ‘the State[] [is afforded] a wide scope of discretion . . . . A 
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify it.’” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961))).    
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particularly significant because, as courts frequently admit, the re-
sponsible-procreation and the optimal-child-rearing arguments are 
dramatically over and underinclusive.  Different-sex couples may mar-
ry even if they never intend to have children and, indeed, even if they 
are incapable of having biological children together, due to age or 
other physical conditions.266  And same-sex couples routinely raise 
children together, whether through artificial insemination, adoption, 
or prior heterosexual relationships. 
Furthermore, the proffered justifications are weak.  The responsi-
ble procreation argument rests on a tenuous distinction between same-
sex and different-sex couples, namely, that the former cannot have 
children accidentally and the latter can.  While this is generally true (al-
though some gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals do have children ac-
cidentally through heterosexual intercourse), it is tangential to the 
state’s ostensible interest in protecting children.  Certainly, valid inter-
ests are served by encouraging all couples that have children to support 
each other and their children, and formal recognition through a 
process like marriage may facilitate these objectives.  But the argument 
that the possibility of accidental conception leads to irresponsible pa-
renting relies on unproven assumptions about behavior.  Furthermore, 
excluding same-sex couples from the benefits and obligations of mar-
riage does not further the state’s interest in promoting stable hetero-
sexual families.  Rather, since same-sex couples routinely raise children 
together, denial of marriage to those who wish to marry undermines 
the state’s larger interests in promoting such stability.  As New York’s 
former chief judge pointed out in dissent from a holding that the state’s 
different-sex marriage requirement passed rational basis review, 
“[t]here are enough marriage licenses to go around for everyone.”267 
The optimal-child-rearing argument is also unpersuasive.  While 
the New York court held that it is common sense that “children will do 
best with a mother and father in the home,”268 social science studies 
fail to confirm that there are any significant differences between 
266 Even the dissenters in Lawrence acknowledge that “encouragement of procrea-
tion” could not “possibly” be a justification for denying same-sex couples the right to 
marry “since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.”  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
267 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 30 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting); see also In re Marriage Cas-
es, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008) (“While retention of the limitation of marriage to 
opposite-sex couples is not needed to preserve the rights and benefits of opposite-sex 
couples, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the designation of marriage works a 
real and appreciable harm upon same-sex couples and their children.”). 
268 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 8. 
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children raised by different-sex parents and children raised by same-
sex parents.269  Moreover, in many of the states where the issue has 
been litigated (as well as in many other states), state law or policy 
permits same-sex couples to adopt children.270  Those states have al-
ready implicitly or explicitly endorsed this living environment or, at 
the very least, determined that children are not harmed by being 
raised by same-sex couples.  Additionally, as one of us has contended 
elsewhere, the argument that mothers and fathers, by virtue of their 
sex, necessarily provide distinct role models for children, relies on es-
sentialized understandings of gender that modern sex discrimination 
doctrine deems impermissible in other contexts.271 
These child-centered justifications rely heavily on the historical 
linkage of marriage, child rearing, and procreation.  Indeed, in adopt-
ing the arguments, many courts cite back to marriage decisions from 
the middle of the twentieth century or even earlier.272  As discussed in 
269 See, e.g., COMM. ON LESBIAN, GAY, & BISEXUAL CONCERNS ET AL., AM. PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ASS’N, LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING 15 (2005) (“[E]vidence to date suggests 
that home environments provided by lesbian and gay parents are as likely as those pro-
vided by heterosexual parents to support and enable children’s psychological 
growth.”); Gregory M. Herek, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in the United 
States:  A Social Science Perspective, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 607, 613 (2006) (“Empirical 
studies comparing children raised by sexual minority parents with those raised by oth-
erwise comparable heterosexual parents have not found reliable disparities in mental 
health or social adjustment.”); Ruth Ullmann Paige, Proceedings of the American Psycho-
logical Association for the Legislative Year 2004, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 436, 496 (2005) 
(“[R]esearch has shown that adjustment, development, and psychological well-being of 
children is unrelated to parental sexual orientation and that the children of lesbian 
and gay parents are as likely as those of heterosexual parents to flourish.”); Ellen C. 
Perrin, Comm. on Psychological Aspects of Child & Family Health, Technical Report:  
Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 341, 343 (2002) 
(“No data have pointed to any risk to children as a result of growing up in a family with 
1 or more gay parents.”).   
270 California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Vermont permit a same-sex couple to 
jointly petition for an adoption.  See Human Rights Campaign, Parenting Laws:  Joint 
Adoption and Second Parent Adoption ( July 6, 2009), http://www.hrc.org/ 
documents/parenting_laws_maps.pdf.   Additionally, Colorado and Pennsylvania permit 
a same-sex partner to petition to adopt the child of her partner.  Id.  In numerous other 
states, some jurisdictions have held that joint or second-parent adoption is available to 
same-sex couples, and in many jurisdictions, the law is simply unclear.  Id.  Only a hand-
ful of states explicitly prohibit same-sex couples from adopting.  Id. 
271 See Widiss et al., supra note 159, at 489-92 (“The differences ascribed to the fe-
male and male role models reflect deep-seated stereotypes regarding male and female 
characteristics that are properly condemned as sex discrimination.”). 
272 See, e.g., Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 982 (Wash. 2006) (supporting 
the responsible procreation argument by claiming that “as Skinner, Loving, and Zablocki 
indicate, marriage is traditionally linked to procreation and survival of the human 
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Part I, connections between marriage and procreation have eroded 
considerably.273  In other contexts, courts have held that distinctions 
between nonmarital and marital procreation violate constitutional 
rights held by either parents or children.274  Accordingly, it is not clear 
why a preference for marital families should suffice here.  In fact, states 
have enacted a range of statutory provisions that break down preexist-
ing distinctions between marital and nonmarital children.275  Consider-
ing that the procreation and child-rearing arguments are hard to justify 
in the modern world even under rational basis review, they are almost 
certainly inadequate to satisfy any form of heightened scrutiny. 
Perhaps because of these collective weaknesses, California, Con-
necticut, and New Jersey all chose to forego reliance on either the re-
sponsible-procreation or optimal-child-rearing arguments in defend-
ing their states’ different-sex-marriage requirements.276  The primary 
remaining argument—relied on in all three states—is that tradition is 
sufficient justification for preserving different-sex-marriage require-
ments.  This argument is inadequate for reasons discussed in the next 
Section.  Other interests put forward by states have not been found 
sufficient, even by state courts that ultimately permitted different-sex 
marriage requirements to stand under the child-related rationales dis-
cussed above.  These include that limiting marriage to different-sex 
race”); see also Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 630 (Md. 2007) (supporting the re-
sponsible procreation argument by citing Loving, Skinner, and Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 
190 (1888)).   
273 See supra subsection I.D.1. 
274 See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (requiring procedural safe-
guards before terminating a nonmarital biological father’s relationship with his child-
ren); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (ruling that unmarried persons have an 
equal right to use contraceptives); Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 
73 (1968) (striking down a law barring a mother from recovering in an action based 
on the wrongful death of her illegitimate child); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) 
(overturning a law barring an illegitimate child from recovering in an action based on 
the wrongful death of her mother). 
275 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.  
276 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 430 (Cal. 2008) (noting that the 
argument from procreation was made in an amicus brief rather than in the state’s 
brief); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 477-78 (Conn. 2008) (noting 
that the defendants disavowed any claim that the legislation establishing “a separate 
legal framework for committed same sex couples was motivated by the belief that the 
preservation of marriage as a heterosexual institution is in the best interests of child-
ren, or that prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying promotes responsible hetero-
sexual procreation”); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 205-06 (N.J. 2006) (“The State 
concedes that state law and policy do not support the argument that limiting marriage 
to heterosexual couples is necessary for either procreative purposes or providing the 
optimal environment for raising children.”). 
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couples preserves limited state resources, that denial of marriage rights 
to same-sex couples promotes uniformity among states, and that, under 
separation-of-powers principles, any changes should be made by the leg-
islature rather than the courts.277  Probably as a result of the rapidly 
growing societal acceptance of gays and lesbians, as well as the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Lawrence and Romer, states have not relied upon 
pure morality rationales, although these often appear in amicus brief-
ing.278  Thus, it seems quite likely that if courts adopted our equal access 
analysis, states would find it difficult to articulate any arguments that 
would be adequate to overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality. 
2.  Creation of a Separate Status 
Recent polls demonstrate a growing sense that many members of 
the public think it is unfair or foolish to deny same-sex couples the 
rights and responsibilities of a legal status like marriage but that they 
are also uncomfortable with “changing” the “traditional” definition 
of marriage.279  In response to this reality, several states have created 
civil unions or domestic partnerships that are available to same-sex 
couples.  In some states, courts have held that the state could satisfy 
277 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 446-52 (discussing the state’s claims 
that statutes were justified by tradition, comity, separation-of-powers, and procreation-
based arguments); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 873 (Iowa 2009) (observing that 
county-claimed statutes were justified by child-rearing concerns, conservation of state 
resources, and a state interest in promoting a traditional notion of marriage). 
278 See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Center for Law and Justice in 
Support of Respondent Proposition 22 Legal Defense and Education Fund at 14-15, In 
re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (No. S147999) (arguing the “impossibility of distin-
guishing on principled grounds same-sex marriage and polygamy”). 
279 For example, a CBS News/N.Y. Times nationwide poll conducted in June 2009 
asked, “Which comes closest to your view?  Gay couples should be allowed to legally 
marry, OR, gay couples should be allowed to form civil unions but not legally marry, 
OR, there should be no legal recognition of a gay couple’s relationship?” CBS 
News/N.Y. Times Poll, Supreme Court Nominee Sonia Sotomayor ( June 12-16, 2009), 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/poll_sotomayor_061709.pdf.  The 
poll found that, of all respondents, 33% supported marriage, 30% supported civil un-
ions but not marriage, and 32% supported no recognition.  Id.  A Fox News/Opinion 
Dynamics Poll conducted in May 2009 reported very similar results. See Fox 
News/Opinion Dynamics Poll (May 12-13, 2009), available at http:// 
www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/051809_issues_web.pdf  (finding that 33% supported 
legal marriage, 33% supported alternate legal partnership, and 29% supported no 
recognition).  A Quinnipiac University poll conducted in April 2009 found that 38% 
would support and 55% would oppose a state law permitting same-sex couples to marry 
but also that 57% would support and 38% would oppose a law permitting civil unions.  
Quinnipiac University Poll (Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://www.quinnipiac.edu/ 
x1295.xml?ReleaseID=1292.    
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constitutional requirements by providing access to such “equivalent” 
statuses.  High courts in New Jersey, Vermont, and California have de-
cided that denying same-sex couples the rights and benefits of marriage 
is unconstitutional but that the state may rectify this problem by creat-
ing a separate status for same-sex couples that provides all the same le-
gal protections as marriage.280  In other states, legislatures have created 
such statuses without being required to do so by a court.281 
Same-sex couples have therefore begun to challenge the relega-
tion of their relationships to these (ostensibly) “separate but equal” 
legal statuses.  Massachusetts and Connecticut have both held explicit-
ly that such separate statuses are insufficient and that same-sex couples 
must be permitted to marry.282  In this Section, we show why it would be 
unlikely that limiting same-sex couples to a separate status would pass 
constitutional scrutiny under our equal access approach.  Indeed, we 
think that the equal protection approach that we advocate is far better 
280 See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 75-76 (Cal. 2009) (reading the state constitu-
tion to require equal rights for same-sex couples, but not including equal access to the 
“designation of ‘marriage’”); Lewis, 908 A.2d at 221 (holding that creation of civil un-
ions would comport with equal protections granted by the state constitution); Baker v. 
State, 744 A.2d 864, 887 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the state constitution requires com-
mon benefits and protections but that these need not come from a marriage license).  
As discussed above, in 2008, the California Supreme Court had overturned a state sta-
tute that prohibited same-sex marriage, and same-sex marriages were permitted in the 
state for a period of several months.  The court subsequently upheld a constitutional 
amendment overruling its prior decision.  In reaching this determination, it appeared 
to rely heavily on the fact that the state had already created—and was maintaining—a 
separate domestic partnership status providing the legal benefits of marriage to same-
sex couples.  See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 61 (“[Proposition 8] carves out a narrow and li-
mited exception to the[] state constitutional rights, reserving the official designation of 
the term ‘marriage’ for the union of opposite-sex couples as a matter of state constitu-
tional law, but leaving undisturbed all of the other extremely significant substantive 
aspects of a same-sex couple’s state constitutional right to establish an officially recog-
nized and protected family relationship and the guarantee of equal protection of the 
laws.”)  Also, although the Vermont Supreme Court had held that separate civil union 
status could be constitutionally permissible, the legislature subsequently chose to permit 
same-sex couples to marry.  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2009) (defining marriage as 
“the legally recognized union of two people” and thereby including same-sex couples). 
281 See, e.g., H.R. 436, 2010 Leg. (N.H. 2010) (enacted 2010).   
282 See Kerrigan, v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 480 (Conn. 2008) (hold-
ing that same-sex couples cannot be denied the right to marry despite the availability 
of civil unions); Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 571 (Mass. 
2004) (holding that the creation of a separate status would be impermissible under the 
state constitution).  In the Iowa litigation, the state had not created a separate status so 
the issue was not directly before the court, but the state supreme court still noted that 
“[a] new distinction based on sexual orientation would be equally suspect and difficult 
to square with the fundamental principles of equal protection embodied in [Iowa’s] 
constitution.”  Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 906.  
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suited to analysis of the stigma and dignitary harms associated with a 
separate status than an independent due process analysis is likely to be. 
First, is the burden on the right to marry substantial?  In some 
sense, the answer turns on an understanding of the nature of the 
right.  To the extent that the right simply involves the tangible gov-
ernment benefits associated with marriage, there is no denial.  How-
ever, as courts and commentators routinely recognize, marriage also 
carries great symbolic and intangible significance.283  Indeed, it is pre-
cisely because of the central importance of the institution of marriage 
and the sense that the word itself carries particular meaning that op-
ponents of wider marriage rights argue so strenuously that it should 
be reserved for different-sex couples.  As one Connecticut legislator 
admitted forthrightly, creating civil union status permitted the legisla-
tors to expand rights for same-sex couples while at the same time as-
suring their constituencies that “we didn’t . . . do it in a way that you 
[would find] offensive either to your core beliefs, to your religious be-
liefs, or to your view of what marriage is.”284  Creating a separate status 
for same-sex couples that lacks this history and tradition necessarily 
denies access to these aspects of marriage, even as it permits enjoy-
ment of its legal benefits.  As the California Supreme Court points 
out, many will understand a separate status to mean a lesser status: 
[B]ecause of the long and celebrated history of the term ‘marriage’ and 
the widespread understanding that this word describes a family relation-
ship unreservedly sanctioned by the community, the statutory provisions 
that continue to limit access to this designation exclusively to opposite-
sex couples . . . likely will be viewed as an official statement that the fami-
ly relationship of same-sex couples is not of comparable stature or equal 
dignity to the family relationship of opposite-sex couples.
285
 
Moreover, even in states that claim to have extended all the legal 
rights and responsibilities of marriage to same-sex couples, experience 
is beginning to show that the statuses remain tangibly distinct.  New 
283 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 452 (recognizing the social and histori-
cal importance of marriage); Scott, supra note 126, at 562-66 (discussing symbolic and 
social meanings of marriage); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2098 (“[T]he underlying logic 
of the right to marry has everything to do with the fundamental importance of the ex-
pressive interests at stake.”); id. at 2118 (“The most plausible account [of why the right 
to marry should qualify as a fundamental interest for equal protection purposes] 
points to the expressive benefits of marriage.”). 
284 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 477 n.80 (quoting 48 H.R. Proc., Pt. 7, 2005 Sess. (Conn. 
2005) (remarks of Rep. Robert M. Ward)) (alterations in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
285 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 452. 
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Jersey and Vermont, two of the states that have created civil unions, 
each recently appointed commissions to study how well they were 
working.  Both issued reports finding that, despite the legislative in-
tent to create equivalent statuses, significant differences remain.286  
Both reports noted concrete, tangible harms largely resulting from 
third parties’ confusion about the significance of civil unions and lack 
of understanding that they were intended to be equivalent to mar-
riages.  For example, the commissions found that employers were less 
likely to provide health benefits to members of civil unions and that 
health care workers improperly denied members of civil unions access 
to medical information regarding their partners and improperly re-
fused to permit them to make medical decisions for their partners.287  
The New Jersey report also included testimony from residents of Mas-
sachusetts, which permits same-sex marriage, showing that both issues 
were much less prevalent in Massachusetts, where third parties instant-
ly understood the meaning of “marriage,” even when applied to a 
couple whose members were of the same sex.288 
Both reports also emphasized significant intangible harms asso-
ciated with the separate statuses.289  Witnesses baldly stated that “sepa-
286 See N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMM’N, THE LEGAL, MEDICAL, ECONOMIC & SO-
CIAL CONSEQUENCES OF NEW JERSEY’S CIVIL UNION LAW 1 (2008) [hereinafter NEW 
JERSEY REPORT], available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcr/downloads/CURC-Final-
Report-.pdf (finding that civil unions “encourage[] unequal treatment”);  OFFICE OF 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, REPORT OF THE VERMONT COMMISSION ON FAMILY RECOGNI-
TION AND PROTECTION 26 (2008) [hereinafter VERMONT REPORT], available at 
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/WorkGroups/FamilyCommission/VCFRP_Report.pdf (find-
ing that many members of civil unions “encountered . . . instances where they find the 
promise of equality to be unfulfilled”). 
287 See NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 286, at 11-15; VERMONT REPORT, supra note 
286, at 10. 
288 See NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 286, at 20-24.  Notably, even marriages of 
same-sex couples within Massachusetts substantively differ from marriages of different-
sex couples since the former are not recognized as marriages under federal law.  See 1 
U.S.C. § 7 (2006 & Supp. I 2009) (defining marriage for federal purposes as “a legal 
union between one man and one woman”).  The New Jersey report found that, none-
theless, third parties were more likely to recognize the relationships as “marriages” and 
even to accord them benefits, such as health benefits, that the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) arguably did not require because failure to do so would 
more obviously constitute discrimination.  See NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 286, at 
21 (“It is not that ERISA-covered employers in Massachusetts don’t understand that 
federal law allows them to refrain from providing benefits to same-sex married 
couples.  It’s that employers also understand that without the term ‘civil union’ or 
‘domestic partner’ to hide behind . . . [e]mployers would have to acknowledge that 
they are discriminating against their employees because they are lesbian or gay.”). 
289 See NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 286, at 15-20 (setting forth testimony re-
garding the negative psychological impact that the separate status represented by civil 
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rate is not equal” and compared their experience to past racial segre-
gation.290  They described psychological harm and feeling less 
pected than married siblings or family members.291  Children of same-
sex couples testified that they felt the civil union status singled out 
their parents as different and less valuable in a way that marriage 
would not.292  Again, this testimony contrasted with evidence from 
Massachusetts, which showed that marriage by same-sex couples was 
much more widely recognized as truly equivalent.293  While one would 
expect that time would gradually mitigate some of these concerns, the 
Vermont report was issued after the state already had permitted civil 
unions for eight years.  And, notably, a year after the report was is-
sued, and after numerous public hearings and debates on the issue, 
the Vermont legislature chose to permit same-sex couples to marry.294  
In our view, for these reasons, denial of a right to “marry,” even with 
access to a purportedly equivalent status, would be a sufficient burden 
to clear the threshold test. 
Does the law treat groups unevenly?  For the same reasons dis-
cussed above, creating a separate status constitutes discrimination on 
unions can have); VERMONT REPORT, supra note 286, at 6, 9 (presenting testimony 
from members of civil unions and their families about the mentally deleterious effects 
that separate status has on them). 
290 E.g., VERMONT REPORT, supra note 286, at 7.  For example, a psychologist who 
worked with children of same-sex couples testified at a public hearing:  
In my experience with children, the fact that their parents cannot marry and 
have to have an alternative to marriage sends a very bad message.  It is no dif-
ferent than water fountains for “negroes” and “whites” 45 years ago.  The mes-
sage is, “your family isn’t good enough and therefore your parents are unable 
to marry.  
Id. at 6-7. 
291 See, e.g., NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 286, at 19 (noting testimony from a gay 
teenager regarding a feeling of inferiority compared to his straight siblings because un-
like them, he could not envision his future with marriage in it); VERMONT REPORT, supra 
note 286, at 9 (telling the story of a father who would not attend one son’s civil union 
ceremony despite going to another son’s same-sex marriage ceremony in Massachusetts). 
292 See NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 286, at 17-19 (emphasizing the challenges 
faced by children of same-sex couples in a civil union, particularly those arising from 
peers questioning their families’ validity); see also VERMONT REPORT, supra note 286, at 10-
11 (concluding that children do well in gay- and lesbian-headed families but that recog-
nizing their parents’ relationship as marriage would provide additional benefits). 
293 See NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 286, at 20-24 (evaluating the effects of allow-
ing same-sex couples to marry in Massachusetts, and concluding that they are over-
whelmingly positive and that simply changing the term from “civil union” to “mar-
riage” can remedy the documented ills associated with civil unions). 
294 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2009) (defining marriage to include same-sex 
couples). 
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the basis of sexual orientation.  Members of same-sex couples who 
seek to marry their chosen partners are denied that right on the basis 
of their sexual orientation.  This is true so long as marriage is explicit-
ly reserved for different-sex couples, even if, as is the case in some 
states, heterosexual couples are permitted to choose whether to be 
married or to enter into a civil union or domestic partnership.295 
By contrast, if the state chose to stop performing civil marriages 
entirely and substituted civil union status or domestic partner status 
for all couples, there would no longer be an evenhandedness difficul-
ty.  Thus, we believe that a decision to do so would not run afoul of 
the equal access approach we propose. 
However, assuming that the state maintained separate statuses and 
denied same-sex couples the right to civil marriage, the result would 
ultimately turn on the third question:  is there sufficient justification 
for the difference in treatment to overcome a presumption of uncons-
titutionality?  The primary rationale put forward by states defending 
the creation of such separate statuses is that they are appropriate or 
necessary to preserve the “traditional” definition of marriage.  As courts 
have noted, this justification is hard to distinguish from the exclusion 
itself—it is, of course, this very definition that is at issue.296  Moreover, as 
is widely recognized in other equal protection contexts, tradition is an 
inadequate justification for ongoing discrimination.  Indeed, the Equal 
Protection Clause was enacted with the specific intention of dismantling 
discriminatory traditions that were in place at the time. 
Equal protection analysis, as opposed to due process analysis, his-
torically has been the vehicle used to assess the stigma and dignitary 
harms associated with the creation of “separate but equal” institutions.  
Of course, famously, the Brown Court relied on the Equal Protection 
Clause to hold that separate educational facilities were “inherently 
unequal.”297  Notably, the Court accepted lower courts’ findings that 
the black and white schools were equalized, or were being equalized, 
295 In some instances, because of federal tax, benefits, or inheritance rules, a hete-
rosexual couple might choose to register under one of these alternative statuses rather 
than marry since they would not be considered “married” for federal purposes.  This 
could permit an individual to continue receiving, for example, social security survivor 
benefits that would otherwise be forfeited upon remarriage.  See, e.g., NEW JERSEY RE-
PORT, supra note 286, at 3, 42-44 (recommending that same-sex couples be permitted 
to marry but that the state continue to permit couples to register as domestic partners 
to reap some of these benefits).  
296 See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 478 (Conn. 2008) 
(“[T]he justification of ‘tradition’ does not explain the classification; it merely repeats it.”). 
297 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
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“with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of 
teachers, and other ‘tangible’ factors.”298  Accordingly, the Court’s 
holding turned explicitly on the intangible and psychological harms 
associated with segregation.  The Court concluded that the creating a 
separate system was itself a harm that was cognizable under the Equal 
Protection Clause because it instilled in children a “feeling of inferior-
ity as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and 
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”299 
In other contexts, as well, the Court has pointed to the intangible 
benefits of long-standing institutions in holding that newly created 
separate alternatives were inadequate.  Thus, for example, in Sweatt v. 
Painter, the Court was clear that a newly created African American law 
school could not manufacture the connections and status that the 
University of Texas Law School enjoyed.300  Likewise, in United States v. 
Virginia, the Court was clear that a newly created military institute for 
young women could not manufacture the connections and status that 
the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) enjoyed.301  Admittedly, these new 
institutions differed in several tangible ways from their counterparts, 
and the distinctions were of considerably greater magnitude than the 
tangible differences between marriage and civil union.302  But the 
Court held that even “more important” than these tangible distinc-
tions was the lack of tradition and standing in the community from 
which these institutions would suffer.303 
The same is true of marriage.  The term marriage carries a societal 
significance that cannot be manufactured.  The experience in Massa-
298 Id. at 492; see also id. at 492 n.9 (specifying the findings of each lower court re-
garding the state of equalization between the schools in their respective states).  
299 Id. at 494. 
300 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950). 
301 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
302 See id. at 551-52 (cataloguing differences in faculty, athletic facilities, and en-
dowment); Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633-34 (cataloguing differences in, among other things, 
faculty, library volumes, class size).  
303 Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634 (“What is more important, the University of Texas Law 
School possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective 
measurement but which make for greatness in a law school.  Such qualities, to name 
but a few, include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position 
and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige.”); 
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 553 (asserting that Virginia had created “a ‘pale shadow’ of VMI in 
terms of the range of curricular choices and faculty stature, funding, prestige, alumni 
support and influence”).  In the VMI case, the Court characterized the newly created 
military institute as “reminiscent of the remedy Texas proposed” in Sweatt, and quoted 
extensively from the earlier case with its emphasis on the intangible significance of 
tradition and prestige.  Id. at 553-54.  
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chusetts shows that this meaning can endure even with inclusion of 
same-sex couples.  As the number of states permitting same-sex mar-
riage continues to multiply, this will be all the more evident.  Creating a 
separate civil union or domestic partnership status is a laudable step 
forward in expanding rights to same-sex couples.  However, we feel it 
fails to meet the government’s obligations.  Having decided to create civ-
il marriages, states must provide access to them on an evenhanded basis. 
CONCLUSION 
Equal access provides a sensible way for courts to protect a right to 
marry for same-sex couples.  Not only does it match the structure of the 
right, but it also avoids the pitfalls of the primary alternatives, which ask 
courts either to declare a fundamental due process right to marry that 
includes the right to marry a person of the same sex, or to announce a 
new suspect classification.  Now that the legal challenge to different-sex 
marriage laws has entered federal court in earnest, finding a theory that 
makes sense both conceptually and pragmatically has become urgent. 
Beyond the current controversy, our equal access proposal has 
important implications for future constitutional issues.  For example, 
equal access provides a sensible framework for assessing state bans on 
adoption by same-sex couples.  Given the fundamental importance of 
child rearing, the state should be required to provide a compelling 
justification for selectively denying certain couples the right to adopt 
children.  Likewise, the equal access approach could be used to assess 
traditional bans on polygamy and incest.  While some varieties of these 
restrictions on civil marriage likely can be justified by important state 
interests, including concerns over the welfare of women and offspring, 
others inhibit access to civil marriage without sufficient justification. 
Finally, as we have suggested, equal access provides one avenue for 
building into federal constitutional law a principle that often exists in 
state and foreign constitutions—namely, the right to dignity.  Argua-
bly already essential to much familiar federal constitutional jurispru-
dence, dignity could play an important role in our national conversa-
tion about the constitutionality of laws that restrict certain groups’ 
access to fundamentally important government programs, such as vot-
ing and civil marriage.  Our equal access theory provides one frame-
work for that kind of conversation. 
 
